INTERPERSONA
An International Journal

Research Articles

Interpersonal trust beyond Sèvres: personal diplomacy in the Bouillon–Mustafa Kemal negotiations, 1921–1923

Fatma Uygur[1], Hasan Dinçer[2], İbrahim Yorgun[3]

[1] Department of Balkan Studies, Institute of Social Sciences, Ankara University; Ankara, Türkiye. **[2]** Department of History of the Turkish Revolution, Institute of Social Sciences, Ankara University; Ankara, Türkiye. **[3]** Office of the President, Middle East Technical University (METU); Ankara, Türkiye.

Interpersona, 2026, Vol. 20 (2), https://doi.org/10.54899/ijpr.v20i2.973

Received: 2025-5-29 • **Accepted:** 2025-7-29 • **Published (VoR):** 2026-10-18

Corresponding author: İbrahim Yorgun, Office of the President, Middle East Technical University (METU); Ankara, Türkiye, E-mail: iyorgun@metu.edu.tr

Abstract

The failure of the Treaty of Sèvres and the rise of the Turkish National Movement transformed Franco-Turkish relations after the First World War, forcing France to search for new diplomatic channels in Anatolia. In this context, French politician and unofficial envoy Franklin Bouillon emerged as a key intermediary between Paris and Ankara during the negotiations that led to the Ankara Agreement of October 1921. Rather than presenting the agreement solely as a strategic adjustment in French foreign policy, the article argues that Bouillon's personal rapport with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk helped create the conditions for political rapprochement between France and the Turkish National Movement. Drawing on French diplomatic archives, parliamentary records, contemporary newspapers, and recent historiography, the study explores how personal trust, symbolic gestures, and informal diplomatic practices enabled negotiations to progress beyond the rigid framework of the Treaty of Sèvres. It further demonstrates how controlled communication and unofficial channels contributed to the legitimization of the Ankara government in the eyes of France. By focusing on the interaction between individual agency and diplomatic culture, the article suggests that political outcomes in the early interwar period often depended as much on personal relationships as on formal state policy.

Keywords

interpersonal trust, personal diplomacy, Franco-Turkish relations, Franklin Bouillon, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Ankara Agreement, diplomatic culture

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, CC BY 4.0, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction, provided the original work is properly cited.

INTRODUCTION

The immediate aftermath of the First World War (1919-1923) was marked by the collapse of imperial structures and the uncertain redefinition of relations between European powers and emerging nation-states. For France, preserving its influence in the Levant became a pressing concern, even as it faced the challenge of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's nationalist movement. Traditional diplomatic frameworks, anchored in the Treaty of Sèvres and inter-Allied arrangements, quickly revealed their limitations.

Against this backdrop, Henri Franklin Bouillon (1870-1937), deputy, journalist, and former minister, advanced an alternative approach. His mission to Ankara in 1921, conducted largely outside conventional diplomatic channels, relied on personal contacts, flexible bargaining, and unofficial communication. The Ankara Agreement of 20 October 1921 brought an end to Franco-Turkish hostilities in Cilicia and signaled France's implicit recognition of Turkish nationalism (Kammerer, 1933, pp. 15-19; Dumont, 1988, pp. 23-45).

Existing scholarship has primarily examined the Ankara Agreement through the prism of strategic realignment, Franco-British rivalry, and the broader diplomatic settlement of the postwar Middle East. While these approaches remain essential, they have paid less attention to the interpersonal dimensions of diplomacy and the role of informal political mediation in shaping negotiations. This article examines how interpersonal trust, personal diplomacy, and informal political communication contributed to the success of Bouillon's negotiations with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and influenced broader diplomatic outcomes. Rather than treating the Ankara Agreement solely as a strategic adjustment in French foreign policy, the study argues that personal relationships, symbolic credibility, and informal channels of communication played an important role in facilitating diplomatic accommodation during a period of political uncertainty.

Drawing on archival records, parliamentary debates, diplomatic correspondence, contemporary press sources, and recent historiography, the article situates the Bouillon–Mustafa Kemal negotiations within both the strategic concerns of France and the interpersonal dynamics that shaped Franco-Turkish rapprochement. By

doing so, it contributes to broader discussions on diplomatic culture, informal negotiation, and the role of individual actors in the making of the postwar international order.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT, POLITICAL RIVALRIES, AND THE EMERGENCE OF INFORMAL DIPLOMACY

France's policy toward the Ottoman Empire and, later, toward the emerging Turkish nationalist movement rested on intertwined economic, strategic, and political interests. Through financial investments, debt administration, and military presence, France sought to preserve its influence in the eastern Mediterranean while competing with other Allied powers for regional dominance. These tensions became especially visible after the First World War, when the collapse of Ottoman authority transformed the Levant into a space of diplomatic rivalry, military uncertainty, and informal political negotiation. A large portion of Ottoman debt had been contracted with French banks, allowing Paris to exert considerable influence over the Empire's financial and diplomatic affairs. By playing an active role in the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt (Düyun-u Umumiye), France exerted significant pressure on the Empire's financial independence as well as its diplomatic relations (Çapar, 2019, pp. 61-74). The blockade of Mytilene in 1901 constitutes, in this respect, a significant episode that deserves attention. In fact, faced with the Ottoman Empire's inability to honor its debts, the French navy imposed a blockade on the island of Mytilene. This episode illustrates the extent to which France was prepared to use military pressure in order to defend its economic interests (Ünver & Ender, 2018, pp. 348–355).

France's recourse to the military option for the recovery of its claims reached a new stage during the First World War. Within the framework of secret agreements, certain regions of the Ottoman Empire were promised to France. Within this framework, France occupied Adana, Marash, Aintab, and Urfa in 1919 ("Accords Sykes-Picot," n.d.).

The transition from financial influence to direct territorial intervention reflected a broader transformation in French policy after the war. France received Cilicia under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, a choice tied to its earlier strategic and economic interests, particularly cotton and the defense of Syria. As early as 1915, the Comité de l'Asie

française and various economic circles supported its annexation. Considered the gateway to Syria and an essential link in the eastern Mediterranean, Cilicia was occupied after the Armistice of Mudros to consolidate French influence in the Levant (Güçlü, 2001, pp. 1079–1114).

The policy pursued by France in Cilicia between 1919 and 1921 should not be perceived solely as a regional colonial enterprise, but also as the continuation of a struggle for influence with Great Britain. In this context, the note addressed by the French diplomat Robert de Caix to Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, dated 26 January 1920, explicitly set out France's strategic objectives in this region. In this correspondence, de Caix emphasized the geopolitical position of Cilicia, the need to protect Christian minorities, and the importance of securing the land route to Mesopotamia (Ministère des Affaires étrangères [MAE], 1920, pp. 27-29). At the same time, these arguments reveal how strategic discourse, economic interests, and claims of political legitimacy became increasingly intertwined in French diplomatic thinking.

Andrew and Kanya-Forstner analyze these policies in a broader framework, situating them within the context of Franco-British rivalry in the Middle East, and underline that de Caix's reflections mirrored France's general strategic approach at the time (Andrew & Kanya-Forstner, 1974, p. 83). In Stephen Roberts's now-classic work, which addresses the issue in greater depth, the ideological and administrative foundations of the French colonial regime in Cilicia are analyzed in detail; the transition from military intervention to civil administration is presented as a characteristic example of French colonialism (Roberts, 1929, pp. 591–594).

However, the strong Turkish resistance encountered on the ground cast doubt on the viability of the colonial system France sought to establish. From 1921 onwards, the idea that a compromise with the Turks had become inevitable began to take hold in French public opinion and diplomatic circles. As mentioned earlier, the negotiations conducted by Bouillon illustrate an ad hoc diplomacy that led to the Ankara Agreement, a decisive step in redefining Franco-Turkish relations.

During the period of occupation in Ottoman territories, intense debates animated French intellectual and diplomatic circles regarding the policy to be adopted toward the Turks. Religious circles attached to the traditional French role as the "protector of Eastern Christians"

opposed more pragmatic approaches toward Turkey (Ministère des Affaires étrangères [MAE], 1855, pp. 22-24), clashed with financial and economic interests that continued to profit from the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, liberal and republican circles, together with socialist intellectuals opposed to colonialism, voiced a certain sympathy for the Turkish national movement in Anatolia (Bazin, 1981; Farrère, 1922; Zeren, 2020, pp. 355-368). These debates demonstrate that French policy toward Anatolia was shaped not only by strategic considerations but also by competing perceptions, ideological tensions, and diverging understandings of legitimacy and political order.

These divisions within French political and intellectual circles became even more visible as military realities in Anatolia increasingly undermined the sustainability of occupation. In the process of withdrawing from southeastern Anatolia, France experienced dynamics distinct from those of its allies. In conflict of interest with Great Britain in the Middle East, it adopted a more conciliatory policy toward Turkey, in reaction to Britain's intransigence. Italy, for its part, showed a moderate attitude toward Turkish resistance, which facilitated the adoption of a similar stance by France.

As for Greece, supported by Great Britain in its expansionist policy in western Anatolia, France distanced itself and favored the establishment of good relations with Turkey. These divergences led France to define its interests in Anatolia independently of its allies (Chemins de mémoire, n.d.). Ultimately, faced with the vigorous resistance of the Kuvâ-yi Milliye forces (Toker, 2021, pp. 1-2) and under the influence of reactions from its public opinion (Sarraut, 1953, pp. 4-9; Tongas, 1939, p. 7), France withdrew from the Anatolian provinces it occupied, in connection with the evolution of political, military, and diplomatic contexts.

This evolving political environment created the conditions for the rise of intermediary figures such as Franklin Bouillon, whose unofficial methods often appeared more flexible than conventional diplomacy (Turkish Diplomatic Archives, 2022, p. 21). In this environment, diplomatic effectiveness increasingly depended on the ability of certain individuals to establish credible channels of communication across political divides. The emergence of intermediary figures such as Bouillon reflected the growing importance of personal relationships and informal contacts in a context where formal diplomatic mechanisms had become

increasingly constrained.

FRANKLIN BOUILLON AND THE CRISIS OF OFFICIAL DIPLOMACY

By 1921, the limits of conventional diplomacy had become increasingly visible in the French approach toward Anatolia. Military setbacks, disagreements among the Allies, and the failure of earlier negotiations pushed Paris to rely on more flexible and informal channels of negotiation and political communication. In this context, Franklin Bouillon emerged as an intermediary figure capable of operating between official diplomacy and informal political negotiation, relying increasingly on personal credibility and direct communication rather than formal institutional authority.

In 1921, Franklin Bouillon, deputy (Le Journal, 1923), former minister (Le Progrès de Seine-&-Oise, 1937), and chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, was tasked with probing a possible peace with Ankara. He also participated in the formation of Raymond Poincaré's cabinet (1860-1934) (Uygur, 2023, p. 78; Élysée. fr, n.d.) and remained a visible political figure associated with the defense of French national interests (Le Journal, 1929; Le Journal, 1931; Assemblée nationale, n.d.).

Bouillon, a former Radical-Socialist minister and president of the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee, was charged with exploring a path to peace with Ankara. Viewing Turkey as both a barrier against Bolshevism and a strategic link to France's Muslim colonies, he arrived in Istanbul on 27 May 1921 under the guise of a war correspondent (Jolly, 1960-1977, p. 2371), then reached İnebolu on the Black Sea. The mission relied heavily on discretion, personal contact, and the gradual construction of political trust between the French envoy and the Ankara government. There he met Minister Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek, with whom he traveled to Ankara, while the latter transmitted strategic information in advance that allowed Fevzi Çakmak and Yusuf Hikmet Bayur to prepare the Turkish diplomatic line (Ministère des Affaires étrangères [MAE], 1921a, p. 129).

After his initial contacts in İnebolu, Bouillon reached Ankara and began a series of decisive talks. Arriving on 9 June 1921, he delayed discussions for a few days in order not to reveal Briand's eagerness to conclude an agreement. He quickly established a cordial and pragmatic

dialogue with Mustafa Kemal, Fevzi Pasha, and Yusuf Kemal. These early exchanges contributed to a negotiating atmosphere markedly different from the rigid diplomatic framework associated with the Treaty of Sèvres. Although he claimed not to have an official mandate, he acted with wide autonomy. This ambiguity both constrained and strengthened his position, allowing him to negotiate with a degree of flexibility unavailable to formal diplomats. His initial proposals, based on the Treaty of Sèvres, were categorically rejected by the Turkish side, which imposed the *Misak-ı Millî* as the basis for negotiations. This shift forced Bouillon to move beyond the assumptions of the Sèvres framework and adapt his negotiations to the political realities emerging in Ankara. In practice, this required a form of diplomacy based less on formal protocol than on gradual bargaining and political accommodation. Bouillon then requested time to examine this text and, when discussions resumed, proposed to continue on the basis of the London Conference decisions (MAE, 1921b, p. 96).

Bouillon sought to conclude an agreement in Cilicia and to obtain economic guarantees for France, but his demands, including privileges close to the capitulations, were firmly rejected by Mustafa Kemal, who remained attached to the *Misak-ı Millî*. Impressed by this firmness, Bouillon acknowledged points of convergence, while recognizing that no definitive agreement could be concluded without Briand's approval. He nevertheless continued his mission, transmitting unsuccessful draft agreements to Paris, while Briand, reluctant to involve himself in technical aspects, sought the support of General Gouraud for counter-proposals. The successive revisions of the drafts, their referral to Paris for consultation, and the delays in transmission provoked growing Turkish dissatisfaction, especially as British attempts at rapprochement with Ankara intensified (Ministère des Affaires étrangères [MAE], 1921a, p. 19). On 28 July, judging the negotiations at an impasse, Bouillon considered returning to Paris, but the Greek offensive led Briand to postpone in hopes of a favorable balance of power. The Greek defeat at the Sakarya (19 September) confirmed Turkish determination and led Briand to delegate full powers to Bouillon to open genuine negotiations (MAE, 1921a, p. 19). The gradual expansion of Bouillon's authority demonstrates how informal diplomacy increasingly compensated for the paralysis of official inter-Allied policy during the crisis of 1921.

ALLIED TENSIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR INFORMAL NEGOTIATION

After the First World War, France sought to contain Germany while projecting its influence across the Levant, particularly in Syria and southeastern Anatolia, in accordance with the geopolitical arrangements envisioned by the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916). The years 1920-1921, however, marked a turning point: military constraints, financial fragility, and local resistance put these ambitions to the test (Soysal, 1990, pp. 477-492). These growing tensions gradually pushed France toward more flexible diplomatic strategies in Anatolia, where formal inter-Allied coordination increasingly proved ineffective.

In Central and Eastern Europe, Paris attempted to consolidate a network of alliances by tightening its ties with Poland and Czechoslovakia. This tougher line generated friction with London, which was concerned not to isolate Germany to the point of destabilizing the continental balance. Competing visions of the postwar order quickly produced tensions among the Allies, particularly regarding Germany, the eastern Mediterranean, and the future of the Ottoman territories (Jelavich, 2019, pp. 149-152).

On the Mediterranean axis, France and Italy competed for influence in the Levant. The Sykes-Picot carve-up did not satisfy Rome, which also feared the project of a "Greater Greece" in the Aegean. In the Anatolian zones it occupied, Italy adopted a more conciliatory posture toward Turkish resistance, a contrast that indirectly facilitated a gradual rapprochement between Paris and Ankara while also providing Rome with room for maneuver (Sofuoğlu & Yıldırım, 2018, p. 115). In practice, Italy pursued a strategy distinct from that of France in Anatolia, developing a more accommodating approach toward the Turkish nationalists in the territories it held. This divergence weakened Allied cohesion and created additional diplomatic space for unofficial contacts between France and Ankara.

French diplomacy in 1920-1921 therefore had to manage both these allied tensions and the growing military pressure of the Turkish national movement. Under these conditions, the search for a negotiated compromise became increasingly strategic for French diplomacy. The appointment of Philippe Berthelot as secretary-general of the Quai d'Orsay (30 September 1920), in close connection with Alexandre

Millerand, revitalized the diplomatic apparatus. Berthelot pushed for a broad alliance framework, through an expanded Little Entente and openings toward Poland and even Greece to establish a political barrier against Germany and the Soviet Union. The Little Entente itself was a defensive alliance formed by Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia after the First World War (United Nations Archives Geneva, n.d.). However, border disputes between Poland and Czechoslovakia and Greek instability slowed this strategy, illustrating the complexity of international negotiations at the time (Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.-a; Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.-b). These competing priorities revealed the growing difficulty of maintaining a coherent Allied diplomatic strategy in the postwar environment (Armaoğlu, 1983, pp. 188-190; Toynbee, 1927, pp. 278-303).

Because of uncertainty in French policy toward Germany, the Chamber of Deputies refused confidence in the Leygues government (*La Documentation Catholique*, 1921, p. 98; Le Conte, 1937) on 12 January 1921, even though Bouillon, recently returned from Istanbul where he had participated in the ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres (Olcay & Meray, 2020; *Traité de paix entre les Puissances alliées et associées et la Turquie*, n.d.), had already submitted a detailed report, urgently transmitted on 28 November 1920 by Peretti de la Rocca to Ambassador Paul Cambon in London (Celier, 1959, pp. 367-368). Bouillon's discussions with Ottoman authorities revealed three major conclusions: the inapplicability of the Treaty of Sèvres (Dinçer, 2022, p. 112), the urgent necessity of negotiating with the Kemalists, and the importance of these negotiations being explicitly initiated by France, due to distrust of the United Kingdom. This assessment reflected a broader recognition within parts of the French political establishment that formal diplomatic frameworks alone could no longer stabilize the Anatolian crisis. The proposed bases included: French withdrawal from Cilicia in exchange for guarantees for the Armenians, the internationalization of Thrace and Smyrna, recognition of an independent Caucasus, rejection of a Bolshevik alliance, and the expansion of the gendarmerie. An informal Franco-Turkish alliance was envisaged. In this context, informal diplomacy appeared increasingly attractive as an alternative to the rigid structures imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres. However, the growing Soviet influence, particularly through gold and officers sent, risked undermining the goodwill of the Ottoman government and Mustafa Kemal (Commission

de publication des documents diplomatiques français, 1920, pp. 341-342).

On 29 November, Peretti considered that Bouillon's statements on the Turkish nationalists, even if disclosed to the authorities or the public, would favor neither the resolution of the Anatolian question nor any potential negotiations. At the same time, Colonel Stuhl criticized the limited influence of the high commissioner in Turkey and recommended the appointment of a more forceful ambassador, a proposal not accepted (Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français, 1920, p. 342). These disagreements within the French administration reflected broader uncertainty regarding the appropriate balance between official representation and informal political mediation.

According to French diplomats, the attribution of Smyrna to Greece was intended to preserve Allied influence while imposing on Turkey a solution in line with their own vision. France, reluctant to send troops to Smyrna, thus allowed Italy and the United Kingdom to defend their interests through the Greek army. Although the Turks harbored strong prejudices against the Bolsheviks, it would be wrong to think these reservations could not evolve in light of common interests.

Hence, the rapid participation of Italy, the United Kingdom, and France in a proposed solution was deemed crucial. Count Sforza (1872-1952) declared that he fully shared this analysis. While Greece was undergoing deep internal political polarization, some diplomats considered that "Constantine was responsible, but his positions were shared by a Greek majority." Moreover, his presence could indirectly serve French interests, insofar as it placed France in the position of creditor. Reports suggesting that Mustafa Kemal was of Jewish origin reflected the prejudices and propagandistic rhetoric of the period rather than any historically substantiated evidence (Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français, 1920, p. 353). Such claims illustrate the extent to which prejudice, rumor, and political propaganda shaped diplomatic perceptions during the period.

Sforza's unfounded claim regarding Mustafa Kemal should therefore be understood within the broader climate of political propaganda and diplomatic prejudice that shaped perceptions during the period. Moreover, his proposal for an international control regime in Smyrna, similar to that envisaged for Istanbul in the Treaty of Sèvres,

reveals a convergence of interests between France and Italy. The competing projects of the great powers in Ottoman territories reflected deeper divergences over the shape of the postwar order, particularly regarding Germany, the eastern Mediterranean, and the future of the Ottoman territories.

NEGOTIATING THE ANKARA AGREEMENT: STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT AND BOUILLON'S SEARCH FOR COMPROMISE

In 1921, tensions within the Allied camp increasingly undermined the cohesion of the coalition formed at the end of the Great War. Divergences over the application of the Treaty of Sèvres revealed deep fractures, particularly regarding the "Eastern Question" (Clogg, 2013, pp. 101-105). While Great Britain supported Greek expansion in western Anatolia, France, burdened by the costly occupation of Cilicia, sought a compromise with the Turkish nationalists (Earle, 1923, pp. 312–316). Italy, for its part, pursued a strategy of withdrawal and conciliation, allowing Rome to safeguard its interests without being drawn into new military confrontations (Zürcher, 2017, p. 135). Taken together, these developments gradually created a more favorable environment for the kind of negotiated settlement that Franklin Bouillon had been advocating since his earlier contacts with Ankara.

The Greek offensive of the summer of 1921, conducted with British support, aimed to break Turkish resistance on the Sakarya front. However, the failure of this campaign reversed the balance of power. The victory of Mustafa Kemal's forces at Sakarya in September 1921 confirmed the resilience of the Turkish National Movement and forced the Allies to reconsider their strategies (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, pp. 342-344). For Bouillon and other advocates of a negotiated settlement, the outcome at Sakarya reinforced the argument that a durable solution could no longer be achieved through military pressure alone.

For France, the outcome at Sakarya underscored the futility of supporting Greek expansionism and strengthened the advocates of a negotiated solution with Ankara. In diplomatic circles in Paris, voices multiplied to argue that "the time had come to reach an understanding with the Turks, before Great Britain reaped alone the benefits of such a policy" (Bariéty, 1977, p. 219). The changing balance of power therefore strengthened those within French political circles who viewed

negotiation, rather than continued confrontation, as the most realistic path forward.

This urgency was also linked to France's broader geopolitical position. On the one hand, the cost of military operations in Cilicia weighed heavily on public finances already undermined by war debt; on the other, French public opinion, sensitive to the fate of soldiers sent to distant Anatolia, exerted growing pressure for disengagement. Deputies and journalists denounced "a colonial adventure without a future," urging Briand's government to negotiate (Le Temps, 1921; L'Œuvre, 1921). These pressures further increased the political value of diplomatic compromise and reduced support for policies based on prolonged military engagement.

The Ankara Agreement of October 1921 was thus not the result of sudden improvisation, but the culmination of a convergence of domestic, diplomatic, and strategic factors. It reflected a growing awareness among French political elites that reconciliation with Turkey had become indispensable for preserving France's influence in the Levant while avoiding the collapse of its position in the Middle East. Within this changing environment, Bouillon's search for compromise became increasingly aligned with broader French strategic interests. The success of the Ankara Agreement therefore reflected not only geopolitical calculation, but also the growing acceptance of negotiation, diplomatic accommodation, and political dialogue as practical instruments of international politics.

BUILDING TRUST: BOUILLON, MUSTAFA KEMAL, AND INFORMAL DIPLOMACY

With Aristide Briand's return to power, his first initiative was to redefine French policy toward Germany. Supported by President Millerand, he combined the positions of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The pacification of Eastern Europe was then a priority. The neighboring countries of Russia feared a Bolshevik offensive, which prompted them to request military equipment from France. For French diplomacy, one of the most pressing issues, although of only secondary importance on the European scale, was to save the young Austrian republic from bankruptcy, notably through the restructuring of its debt.

Briand also envisaged an international conference to address the economic difficulties of the new states that had emerged from the collapse of the empires. This project, supported by France, however, encountered these states' hesitations and Italy's competing interests in the Danubian basin. This wider European setting mattered because it narrowed the room for formal diplomacy and made alternative channels toward Ankara more attractive to Briand's government.

The Ottoman question was treated as a major strategic issue, revealing Franco-British divergences. While London continued negotiations with the Sultan's government around the Treaty of Sèvres, France opened a parallel dialogue with the Kemalists, concluded an understanding on Syrian-Anatolian spheres, and began a rapid withdrawal from Cilicia. Briand dispatched Bouillon to Ankara to accelerate this rapprochement. The Middle East remained a recurrent zone of tension between France and the United Kingdom; Winston Churchill backed the political ambitions of the Sharif of Mecca's sons, Faisal in Iraq and Abdullah in Transjordan, under British mandates, leaving Syria encircled by two neighbors hostile to French policy. These developments created the conditions for a form of diplomacy that increasingly relied on personal contacts, informal communication, and the gradual construction of political trust between Paris and Ankara.

In its no. 110 issue of January 20, 1921, a Beirut newspaper reported that Robert de Caix referred to ongoing talks toward an agreement with Mustafa Kemal, stressing the latter's wish to meet an official French negotiator; in Paris, it was noted that Hayri Bey, close to Mustafa Kemal, contemplated a meeting with General Gouraud through General Pellé, while Albert Kammerer advised Briand to receive former Ottoman Interior Minister Ahmed Reşid and contacts were pursued in Istanbul via Steeg of the Ottoman Bank. During this period, Bouillon continued confidence-building efforts with Ankara, as the Istanbul newspaper (no. 125, January 20, 1921) also noted (Şimşir, 1981, p. 56; d'Andurain, n.d.; Ministère de la Guerre, 1931-1937, p. 716). Rather than relying exclusively on official diplomatic channels, French policymakers increasingly explored intermediary contacts capable of establishing credibility with the nationalist leadership in Ankara. According to another source dated January 15, Saint-Aulaire reported to the ministry the failure of British attempts to establish contact with Mustafa Kemal (Documents diplomatiques français, 1921, p. 61). On March 11, Berthelot

announced the same-day signature of an agreement between Turkey and Syria covering political, military, economic, and border issues, ordering that a summary telegram be sent to Beirut and Istanbul. Classified "very secret and extremely urgent," it demanded immediate implementation of the military clauses in Beirut and urged facilitation in Istanbul for provisions concerning prisoners (Documents diplomatiques français, 1921, p. 303).

On May 25, Briand confidentially telegraphed Pellé that he would welcome possible talks in Paris provided Kemal retained authority over the nationalists and was genuinely willing to negotiate (Documents diplomatiques français, 1921, p. 686). The next day, in a ciphered telegram dated May 26, 1921, the Ottoman Foreign Minister Ahmed İzzet Pasha informed the presidency of the National Assembly of Bouillon's wish to go to Ankara, emphasizing his political weight and recommending he be received favorably for his respect for national independence and reciprocal dignity (Turkish Diplomatic Archives, 2022, p. 21).

On June 2, Bouillon informed, through General Pellé, of his intention to travel to Ankara. He also asked the French press not to highlight any change in Ankara's attitude and insisted that no parallel negotiations be undertaken during his visit (Documents diplomatiques français, 1921, p. 686). Bouillon's request led to the cancellation of General Gouraud's plan to send naval officer Rollin as an emissary to meet Bekir Sami and Münir Bey (Documents diplomatiques français, 1921, p. 686). On June 7, upon receiving Gouraud's telegram on the matter, Kammerer noted: "General Gouraud knows we do not want any agent in Ankara. The mere presence of a volunteer missionary already causes enough difficulties there" (Documents diplomatiques français, 1921, p. 686). The insistence on avoiding parallel initiatives suggests that French authorities increasingly viewed trust-based personal diplomacy as more effective than multiple competing channels of communication.

Taken together, these documents reveal the complexity of French maneuvering and the political sensitivities surrounding relations with Turkey. Briand's telegram to Pellé shows France's openness to direct dialogue with Mustafa Kemal, whose authority over the nationalist movement was seen as an opportunity. Sending Bouillon to Ankara illustrates this will to draw closer, while the press guidance shows a

concern to manage public opinion and international balances, broadening diplomatic channels and seeking a strategic posture vis-à-vis Ankara. The management of information, public messaging, and diplomatic contacts became an integral part of the negotiation process, demonstrating that political communication was increasingly intertwined with traditional diplomacy.

In his ciphered telegram of June 21, 1921, addressed to Briand, Bouillon reported being received warmly and with confidence by Mustafa Kemal, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister due to his previous initiatives. Acting without an official mandate to better understand conditions in the East and encourage rapprochement, he conveyed that the agreement negotiated by Bekir Sami had been unanimously rejected, chiefly because provisions on "zones of influence" were incompatible with the Misak-ı Millî. Mustafa Kemal expressed personal interest in Bouillon's abilities, asked about his intentions in Paris, hinted that his name could facilitate concessions, and, strictly personally and informally, entrusted new projects to be transmitted to Paris (Documents diplomatiques français, 1921, p. 782). These exchanges suggest that credibility was established gradually through repeated personal interactions rather than through formal diplomatic authority alone. The decision to communicate proposals through Bouillon personally suggests that he had come to be regarded as a credible intermediary by the Ankara leadership. The telegram shows that personal confidence and informal communication had become integral components of the negotiation process, complementing formal diplomatic exchanges between the two sides.

Following these exchanges, an agreement was concluded between the French government and the government of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara on the following points: both parties declared the end of the state of war, to be immediately communicated to armed forces and civil authorities; upon signature, all prisoners of war and detainees, French and Turkish, were to be released without delay at their respective parties' expense and conveyed to the nearest town; this provision applied to all captives regardless of place or circumstances of detention. The telegram added that Bouillon might arrive in Adana on Wednesday to provide further details (Documents diplomatiques français, 1921, p. 782). The rapid progress achieved at this stage reflected the degree to which political confidence had facilitated practical negotiations between

the French government and the Ankara authorities.

In his June 25 telegram from Ankara, Bouillon strongly urged the French government to seize the favorable climate he had created, warning that Turkish demands would only grow and those other Allied powers were preparing to conclude an agreement before France (Documents diplomatiques français, 1921, p. 783). Bouillon's warning illustrates how rapidly diplomatic opportunities could emerge and disappear in the fluid political environment of 1921. It also highlights the strategic importance of trusted intermediaries capable of maintaining direct channels of communication between Paris and Ankara.

RECOGNITION, CONTROVERSY, AND THE LIMITS OF AD HOC DIPLOMACY

In 1921, faced with the failure of the Treaty of Sèvres and the rise of Kemalist power, Briand discreetly initiated a shift in French diplomacy. Supported by Franklin Bouillon, he sought direct contact with Ankara without openly breaking with the Allies. This reorientation marked a pivotal moment in Franco-Turkish relations (Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République de Turquie, 2022, p. XVIII). Bouillon, by bypassing official diplomatic channels, succeeded in establishing a direct link of trust between Paris and Ankara. Despite British espionage activities, his secret diplomacy gave decisive impetus to the negotiations, allowing for more flexible and effective solutions outside formal procedures (Tansel, 1982, p. 649).

The agreement signed on March 11, 1921, between Aristide Briand and Bekir Sami Bey at the London Conference was never ratified by the Grand National Assembly. This failure, which led to Bekir Sami's resignation, nevertheless provided a basis for negotiations relaunched a few months later with Bouillon (Centenaire de l'Accord d'Angora, 2022, pp. 7-13). Between May 24 and August 1, 1921, Bouillon carried out an initial unofficial mission to Ankara to prepare formal negotiations and to end fighting between French forces and the Kuvâ-yi Milliye. This visit, marked by the parallel arrival of Münir Bey in the south and of Bouillon in Ankara (on June 9), opened a decisive phase of diplomatic dialogue (Bayur, 1995, p. 91).

On Briand's instructions, it was expressly required that no

binding commitment be undertaken toward the nationalists (Archives diplomatiques turques, Ankara, p. 17). Bouillon first met with Ottoman authorities and then entered into contact with the leaders of the national movement. He arrived in Ankara on June 9, 1921, and held talks with Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Pasha. He returned from September 15 to October 20. His proposals made it possible to end the French occupation while preserving the status of Hatay and strengthening the French position vis-à-vis Britain. This second visit marked a turning point in Franco-Turkish relations. The relationship that developed between Bouillon and Mustafa Kemal illustrates how personal contacts could facilitate diplomatic engagement during periods of political uncertainty (Yavuz, 1996, pp. 443–464).

At the intersection of military balance and diplomatic stakes, Bouillon's mission exemplified a French strategy based on flexibility, personalized dialogue, and the careful management of political communication in a context of regional transition. In this respect, Bouillon functioned not only as a negotiator but also as an intermediary capable of translating political expectations between Paris and Ankara.

During the Dardanelles crisis, Bouillon abandoned his plan to return to Ankara and instead went to Istanbul to meet with the Allied high commissioners. He then proceeded to Izmir for frank talks with Mustafa Kemal, marking a key step in establishing mutual trust (L'Attaque, 1922). On October 5, a dispute arose when İsmet Pasha demanded the withdrawal of Allied troops from Thrace, following the establishment of Turkish authority. While the British and Italians preferred to keep them until a peace treaty was signed, Charpy believed he could agree on behalf of France. Confronted with the Turkish ultimatum, an emergency meeting in Istanbul led the French and Italians to urge the British to avoid confrontation. Italian support for the French position influenced London's stance. Thus, Ankara consolidated its gains at Izmir, while the Allied loss of Thrace became inevitable (Le Journal, 1922; Documents diplomatiques français, 1920, pp. 346-347).

Bouillon's diplomacy differed from traditional practice through direct exchanges outside official protocols. His ability to establish direct and trusted communication with Mustafa Kemal contributed significantly to the Franco-Turkish rapprochement. His proposals were ultimately transmitted to Gouraud and approved by Briand. This process bore the hallmarks of ad hoc diplomacy (Yürür, 2022, pp. 285-287). The

exchanges, centered on the transfer of authority and regional stability, were pragmatic, flexible, and unofficial. The direct contact between Bouillon and Mustafa Kemal, quickly relayed to Gouraud and Briand, illustrates this approach. By recognizing Ankara before London, France facilitated the international legitimization of Kemalist power (Le Journal, 1922).

The Franco-Turkish agreement remained limited, avoiding broad political commitments such as those undertaken by Italy. France prioritized its interests while minimizing its responsibilities. The public presentation of the agreement was carefully managed to shape expectations and control perceptions, underscoring the importance of communication in diplomacy (Documents diplomatiques français, 1921, p. 454).

Mustafa Kemal Pasha's sincere attitude toward Bouillon fostered an atmosphere of trust between the two sides. The negotiations therefore rested not only on strategic calculations but also on the gradual development of mutual confidence between the principal actors. Bouillon, impressed by the Pasha's leadership style, regarded it as grounded not only in military success but also in simplicity of life and personal consistency. During the negotiations held in Ankara between October 9 and 20, 1921, Mustafa Kemal clearly stated that the foundation of the talks had to be the content of the Misak-ı Millî (National Pact). The Ankara Agreement, signed on October 20, 1921, marked a historic turning point as the first official recognition of the Turkish national movement by a Western power (Atatürk, 1981, pp. 620-625). Trust in this context did not imply political agreement on all issues; rather, it created a framework within which disagreements could be negotiated without disrupting communication.

Bouillon returned several times to Turkey, benefiting from the relationship of confidence that had developed during his earlier visits to Ankara. Trabzon deputy Hüsrev Bey declared of him: "This man had no official authority. However, he came with the consent and knowledge of the French government. … We tried to record as much as possible what he said, what Paşa Hazretleri replied to him, and what we ourselves expressed… We made use of him" (Les procès-verbaux des séances secrètes de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, 2023, p. 105).

Foreign Minister Yusuf Kemal Bey emphasized that Bouillon's

first visit had an exploratory character. He then recalled the successive stages of Bouillon's missions: his efforts concerning Cilicia, his stay in Istanbul during the Battle of Sakarya, and his return to Ankara after the Turkish victory, this time as a fully mandated representative, a point he deemed noteworthy (Les procès-verbaux des séances secrètes de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, 2023, pp. 105, 361).

The Ankara Agreement emerged from a process that relied heavily on informal contacts and confidential negotiations (Association des Amis de Henry Franklin-Bouillon, 1938). It stands as a significant example of the ad hoc diplomatic practices of the time, shedding light on both Turkey's foreign policy strategy and the evolving attitude of French diplomacy. This unofficial, temporary, and issue-centered method enabled the parties to reach a pragmatic solution quickly and laid the groundwork for a new dynamic in bilateral relations.

Yet the United Kingdom perceived the Ankara Agreement as proof of France's boundless betrayal. On October 23, British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon declared: "France attacks us in every newspaper, every music hall, and every cabaret in Paris ridicules us, and then she expects us to weep on her shoulder" (Goold, 1978, pp. 921-931). This statement reflected the growing tensions between the two countries. Britain's fragile regional policy and failures highlighted deep divergences and severe political strain. It demonstrated that France, by adopting a pragmatic approach, had diverged from the British line and acknowledged the weakening of British and Greek influence in Anatolia.

The Quai d'Orsay attempted to calm British anger by claiming that the Ankara Agreement was only a simple arrangement and did not constitute official recognition. Lord Curzon, unconvinced, accused France of betrayal in a note dated November 5.

In response, Bouillon explained in Le Matin on February 10, 1922, the reasons for France's signature of the agreement in the context of British criticism. According to Bouillon, the Ankara Agreement marked a return to peace and to traditional policy toward Turkey, ending a long series of errors since Sèvres. He even argued that this agreement should have been concluded earlier. Britain accused France of signing a separate agreement without informing it or taking its interests into account. Yet as early as 1921, at the London Conference, France had clearly expressed its refusal to continue sacrificing its soldiers in Cilicia to serve King Constantine's ambitions. Obliged to deal with the only effective power in

the region, the Ankara government, France had negotiated under Britain's very eyes. Bouillon insisted that Britain should recognize its mistakes in the Levant over the past three years: the day the Greeks landed at Smyrna, he said, they recreated Turkey and revived Islam. One could rejoice or regret it, but one could not deny its reality (Direction des Archives du Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères & Daire des Archives diplomatiques du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République de Turquie, 2022, pp. 121-124).

The very features that made Bouillon effective in Ankara also made him vulnerable to criticism in France. The Ankara Agreement elevated Franklin Bouillon to the rank of central actor in Franco-Turkish relations, yet his image in France remained highly divisive. For some, he was the statesman who had ended the costly conflict in Cilicia and preserved French influence in the Near East (Kammerer, 1933, pp. 15-19). Others judged him merely as an ambitious adventurer, a deputy without mandate, who circumvented traditional diplomacy and damaged France's credibility (Dumont, 1988, pp. 29-30).

In Ankara, Bouillon was welcomed with honor and respect as a trustworthy interlocutor of Mustafa Kemal. In Paris, however, he was mocked in several political and journalistic circles. The Gazette de Lausanne described him as "a statesman who entered diplomacy without title, without uniform, without portfolio, but who by his boldness achieved more than many others" (La Gazette de Lausanne, 1921).

Within the Chamber of Deputies, Bouillon was sharply criticized by opponents who accused him of conducting negotiations without legal authority. His activities were portrayed as symptomatic of Briand's pragmatic and personal style of diplomacy, opportunistic, effective in the short term, yet detached from parliamentary oversight (Roth, 1993, p. 274).

Nevertheless, the Ankara Agreement produced concrete effects: the French withdrawal from Cilicia, the release of prisoners, recognition of Turkish sovereignty, and preservation of France's cultural and economic interests. Bouillon's success demonstrates how unconventional diplomacy, conducted outside official institutions, could generate decisive outcomes in times of crisis. Yet his career also revealed the limits of such practices. At the same time, Bouillon's experience demonstrated that the effectiveness of ad hoc diplomacy often depended

on the credibility of individual actors and the trust they were able to cultivate. Marginalized after 1921, he received neither ministerial office nor durable responsibility. His role, while crucial, remained controversial, oscillating between recognition and derision. (Hanioğlu, 2011, pp. 143-147). Because such diplomacy relied heavily on personal authority rather than institutional mechanisms, its achievements were often difficult to sustain once the individuals involved left the political stage.

CONCLUSION: INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND THE LEGACY OF INFORMAL DIPLOMACY

The Ankara Agreement of October 1921 stands as one of the most significant diplomatic turning points in the final phase of the Turkish War of Independence. Conducted outside conventional diplomatic channels and entrusted largely to Franklin Bouillon, the negotiations enabled France to disengage from Cilicia while preserving important political, cultural, and economic interests in the region (Kammerer, 1933, pp. 187-191). At the same time, the agreement marked a decisive transformation in Franco-Turkish relations and represented the first official recognition of the Turkish National Movement by a Western power, anticipating the broader international settlement that would culminate in the Treaty of Lausanne (Atatürk, 1981, pp. 620–625; Zürcher, 2017, pp. 133-136).

This study has argued that the Ankara Agreement cannot be understood solely through the lens of strategic calculation, military developments, or shifts in the international balance of power. The Bouillon mission demonstrates that interpersonal trust, personal diplomacy, and informal communication played a crucial role in facilitating dialogue between Paris and Ankara at a moment when formal diplomatic mechanisms had reached their limits. The relationship that developed between Bouillon and Mustafa Kemal helped create a climate of confidence that enabled negotiations to move beyond the rigid framework of the Treaty of Sèvres and toward a pragmatic political settlement (Pernot, 1924, pp. 202-208). The case also suggests that trust functioned as a diplomatic resource, enabling communication and political accommodation where formal institutional mechanisms proved insufficient.

At the same time, the Bouillon case highlights both the

possibilities and the limitations of ad hoc diplomacy. Its effectiveness depended heavily on the credibility of individual actors, the confidence they were able to establish, and their capacity to maintain informal channels of communication. While this approach produced rapid and tangible results, it lacked the institutional durability of formal diplomatic structures. Bouillon himself, despite his central role in achieving the agreement, was gradually marginalized after 1921 and never again exercised comparable diplomatic influence (Dumont, 1988, pp. 41-44).

By examining the Bouillon-Kemal relationship within the broader transformation of Franco-Turkish relations, this article contributes to the historiography of interwar diplomacy by emphasizing the interaction between personal agency and state policy. More broadly, it suggests that periods of international uncertainty often create opportunities for trusted intermediaries whose influence may prove decisive in shaping political outcomes. The Ankara Agreement therefore offers more than a case study of Franco-Turkish rapprochement; it demonstrates how trust, communication, and informal diplomacy could reshape international relations during moments of profound political transition. In this sense, Franklin Bouillon's mission illustrates both the enduring potential and the inherent fragility of diplomatic initiatives built upon personal relationships rather than institutional authority (Georgeon, 1991, pp. 162-163).

References

Ahmad, F. (2008). *From Empire to Republic: Essays on the Late Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. İstanbul Bilgi University Press.

Andrew, C. M., & Kanya-Forstner, A. S. (1974). *France and the Making of the Modern Middle East*. Macmillan.

Armaoğlu, F. (1983). *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*. Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

Assemblée nationale. (n.d.). *Fiche parlementaire de Franklin-Bouillon*. Retrieved May 20, 2025, from https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/Sycomore/Fiche/%28num_Dept%29/3134

Association des Amis de Henry Franklin-Bouillon. (1938). *À la Mémoire de Franklin-Bouillon: Cérémonie du 13 janvier 1938*. Association des Amis de Henry Franklin-Bouillon. Consulted at the Bibliothèque nationale de France, Cote FOL-CNA-1-22 (2507).

Atatürk, M. K. (1981). *Nutuk (Vols. 1-2).* Millî Eğitim Basımevi.

Bariéty, J. (1977). *Les relations franco-allemandes après la Première Guerre mondiale*. Pedone.

Bariéty, J. (1999). *Aristide Briand et la question d'Orient*. CNRS Éditions.

Bayur, Y. H. (1995). *Türk Inkılabı Tarihi (Vol. 3).* Türk Tarih Kurumu.

Bazin, M. (1981). *La presse française et le mouvement national turc*. L'Harmattan.

Bonnefous, G. (1965). *Histoire politique de la Troisième République (Vol. 6).* Presses Universitaires de France.

Celier, L. (1959). *Paul Cambon*. Hachette.

Centenaire de l'Accord d'Angora. (2022). Centenaire de l'Accord d'Angora (1921–2021). Institut français de Turquie. Institut Français de Turquie.

Çapar, O. (2019). *French Capital in the Ottoman Empire (1838-1914)* (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). İstanbul University.

Chemins de mémoire. (n.d.). La France face au jeu des puissances en Méditerranée. Retrieved July 20, 2025, from https://www.cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr

Clogg, R. (2013). *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge University Press.

Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français. (1920). *Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1920.*

D'Andurain, J. (n.d.). Robert de Caix et la question du mandat français au Levant. Les Clés du Moyen-Orient. Retrieved May 23, 2025, from

https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Robert-de-Caix-et-la-question-du.html

Dinçer, H. (2022). *Kongrelerden Birinci Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'ne*. In T. F. Ertan (Ed.), Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi (pp. 112-130). Siyasal Kitabevi.

Direction des Archives du Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Étrangères, & Daire des Archives Diplomatiques du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de la République de Turquie. (2022). Centenaire de l'Accord d'Angora (1921): Documents des archives diplomatiques françaises et turques.

Dumont, P. (1988). Franklin-Bouillon et la diplomatie française en Turquie kémaliste. In P. Dumont & F. Georgeon (Eds.), *La Turquie et la France à l'époque kémaliste* (*1920-1939)* (pp. 23–45). Institut français d'études anatoliennes. L'Harmattan.

Earle, E. M. (1923). *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway*. Macmillan.

Encyclopaedia Britannica. (n.d.-a). *Alexandre Millerand*. Retrieved July 20, 2025, from https://www.britannica.com

Encyclopaedia Britannica. (n.d.-b). *Philippe Berthelot*. Retrieved July 20, 2025, from https://www.britannica.com

Élysée.Fr. (d.d.). *Raymond Poincaré*. Retrieved May 20, 2025, from https://www.elysee.fr/en/raymond-poincare

Farrère, C. (1922). Turquie ressuscitée. Flammarion.

Georgeon, F. (1991). Diplomatie française et nationalisme turc, 1919–1923. *Revue d'histoire diplomatique, 105(2),* 145-163.

Goold, J. (1978). *Lord Curzon and the Anglo-French conflict in the Near East, 1919–1923*. The Historical Journal, 21(4), 921–937.

Güçlü, Y. (2001). Turco-French Struggle for Mastery in Cilicia and the

Ankara Agreement of 1921. *Belleten, 65(244),* 1079-1114.

Hanioğlu, Ş. (2011). *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*. Princeton University Press.

Jelavich, B. (2019). *History of the Balkans (Vol. 2*). Cambridge University Press.

Jolly, J. (1960-1977). *Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français*. Presses Universitaires de France.

Kamberoğlu, A. (2018). *Fransa'nın Ankara Siyaseti ve Demiryolu Meselesi*. Türk Tarih Kurumu.

Kammerer, A. (1933). *La paix d'Angora: Mission Franklin-Bouillon*. Librairie Plon.

L'Attaque. (1922, October 2).

La Documentation Catholique. (1921).No. 98.

La Gazette de Lausanne. (1921, November 5).

Le Conte, R. (1937). *Aristide Briand et la diplomatie française*. Fayard.

Le Journal. (1922, September 23).

Le Journal. (1922, October 9).

Le Journal. (1923, July 9).

Le Journal. (1929, November 22).

Le Journal. (1931, March 4).

Le Matin. (1922, February 10).

Le Progrès de Seine-et-Oise. (1937).

Le Temps. (1921).

Les Procès-Verbaux Des Séances Secrètes de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie. (2023). *Les procès-verbaux des séances secretes de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie*. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Yayınları.

L'Œuvre. (1921).

MAE, Série S.L.C. (1919–1922). *Archives Diplomatiques Françaises (Vol. 137).*

Ministère de la Défense, SHD, Vincennes. (1919-1921). *Archives Militaires Françaises*.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. (1855). 133 CP/322 P/676.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. (1920). *Série Levant, Correspondance (1919–1922) (Vol. 22). (Vol. 22).*

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. (1921a). *Correspondance Diplomatique Française*.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. (1921b). *Correspondance Diplomatique Française*.

Ministère de la Guerre. (1931–1937). *Les armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre (Vol. V, 5.1)*. Imprimerie Nationale.

Olcay, O., & Meray, S. (2020). *Sevr Antlaşması*. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi.

Pernot, M. (1924). *Mustafa Kemal et la Turquie nouvelle*. Payot.

Roberts, S. (1929). *A History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925 (Vol. 2)*. P. S. King & Son.

Roth, F. (1993). *La République et les affaires: 1870–1940*. Seuil.

Sarraut, A. (1953). *Grandeur et servitude coloniales*. Sagittaire.

Shaw, S. J., & Shaw, E. K. (1977). *History of the Ottoman Empire and*

Modern Turkey (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press.

Şimşir, B. N. (1981). *Atatürk ile Yazışmalar (1920–1923) (Vol. 1).* Türk Tarih Kurumu.

Sofuoğlu, A., & Yıldırım, S. (2018). *Milli Mücadele Döneminde Türk-İtalyan İlişkileri*. Berikan.

Soysal, İ. (1990). *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Antlaşmaları (Vol. 1).* Türk Tarih Kurumu.

Tansel, S. (1982). *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (Vol. 4).* Millî Eğitim Basımevi.

Toker, H. (2021). *Kuvâ-yi Milliye Hareketi ve Anadolu Direnişi*. Kronik Kitap.

Tongas, G. (1939). *La Turquie de Kemal*. Bossard.

Toynbee, A. J. (1927). *Survey of International Affairs*. Oxford University Press.

Traité de paix entre les puissances alliées et associées et la Turquie. (n.d.). Signed at Sèvres, 10 August 1920. Retrieved May 20, 2025, from https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/traites/1920sevres.htm

United Nations Archives Geneva. (n.d.). The Little Entente. Retrieved July 20, 2025, from https://libraryresources.unog.ch

Ünver, M., & Ender, M. H. (2018). *Crises and Conflicts in Ottoman-French Relations during the Reign of Abdulhamid II: The 1901 Affair.* İlgi Kültür Sanat Yayınları.

Uygur, F. (2023). Fransız Diplomatik Belgelerinde Balkanlar 1912-1913. Hiperyayın.

Yavuz, B. S. (1996). *Fransız Arşiv Belgelerinin Işığında Türk-Fransız İlişkileri ve Ankara Antlaşması'nın Imzalanması Süreci*. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, 12(36), 443-464.

Yürür, E. (Ed.). (2022). *Documents diplomatiques turcs à l'occasion du centenaire de la Convention militaire de Mudanya: Procès-Verbaux et Documents.* Archives Diplomatiques Turques.

Zeren, M. (2020). *French Public Opinion and the Turkish National Movement*. Journal of Ottoman Studies, 56, 355-368.

Zürcher, E.J. (2017). *Turkey: A Modern History (4th ed.).* I.B. Tauris.

Financing: Not applicable

Acknowledgments: Not applicable

Conflicts of Interest: Not applicable

Statement of Ethics: Not applicable

Data Availability: Not applicable