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Panel Discussion of Eren Duzgin's Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations: Revisiting Turkish Modernity

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Kemalism as Jacobin Progeny: A 'Post-Post-Kemalist' *Transdisciplinary* Approach to Understand the 'Peculiarities' of Turkish Road to Modernity

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Capitalism, Jacobinism, and International Relations: Revising Turkish Modernity. By Eren Duzgun. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022. x + 312pp. $99.99 (hardcover). ISBN: 9781009158343.

Eren Düzgün's *Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations: Revisiting Turkish Modernity* (hereafter CJIR) presents a significant contribution to the burgeoning literature of International Historical Sociology (IHS), particularly concerning the historical sociology of Turkish modernization. It emerges as a noteworthy addition to historical materialism–inspired IHS, standing alongside esteemed works such as Benno Teschke's *The Myth of 1648* (2003), Sandra Halperin's *War and Social Change in Modern Europe* (2003), Charles Post's *The American Road to Capitalism* (2011), Neil Davidson's *How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions?* (2012), Kamran Matin's *Recasting Iranian Modernity* (2013), Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu's *How the West Came to Rule* (2015), and Xavier Lafrance's *The Making of Capitalism in France* (2019), among others. In doing so, CJIR contributes to the ongoing theoretical discussions within IHS, particularly concerning the need to transcend Eurocentric and unilinear narratives of modernity that often overlook the diverse paths to modernization.

Düzgün's work challenges conventional unilinear narratives of global modernity in International Relations (IR). These narratives typically fall into two categories: 'Whiggish' (teleological) and 'anti-Whig' (particularistic and organicist) interpretations of European history. The former emphasizes European agency, portraying the liberal bourgeoisie constructing a new order ('hegemony without dominance') in its image, while the latter focuses on the 'European miracle', suggesting a sudden rise during the Late Medieval period. These perspectives generally attribute Europe's uniqueness to its Greco-Roman-Christian legacy, often seen as the cause of East-West divergence and Western institutional 'superiority'. Düzgün argues for transcending Eurocentric and stagist views, advocating for a nuanced understanding of the multiplicity and interconnectedness in the transition to modernity.

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CJIR suggests that although scholars in IHS have made significant progress in uncovering the international origins of modernity and have successfully addressed the issue of 'methodological internalism' (the perspective that sees historical development as endogenous and self-propelling), they have yet to adequately transcend 'methodological presentism'. Düzgün argues that the field of IHS often projects the logic and dynamics of present economic order, such as capitalism, back onto historical contexts, thereby inadvertently naturalizing them. Thus, methodological presentism often manifests in attempts to naturalize capitalism and its consequences, projecting its presence and distinctive social structures back into pre-capitalist eras. This approach yields ahistorical and nonsocial accounts of historical development. For instance, pivotal developments in human history, such as the emergence of the economy as a purported spontaneous order governed by market rationality, or 'catallaxy' in Hayekian terminology, are mistakenly viewed as inherent aspects of human rationality awaiting liberation from feudal constraints. Consequently, past economies are erroneously depicted as mere precursors or diminutive versions of our contemporary economic systems (p. 24). Düzgün identifies another flaw of 'methodological presentism' as its tendency to conflate the history of modernity with the emergence of capitalism, often by equating modernity solely with the rise of the bourgeoisie (p. 155). This portrayal implies that the ascent of the bourgeoisie represents the definitive transition to modernity. Methodological presentism, as such, overlooks not only the historical specificity of capitalist modernity but also the diverse trajectories and diverging paths to modernity both within and beyond Western Europe, thus undermining the complexity and multiplicity of modernization experiences.

While the acknowledgment of 'the multiple and interactive character of social development' is well established in IHS (see Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015), Düzgün adeptly avoids unilinear conceptions of modernity without succumbing to the limitations of postcolonial approaches. Postcolonial approaches often 'provincialize' Europe by emphasizing 'multiplicity and hybridity' to underscore the distinctions between East and West while simultaneously endorsing the 'Whiggish' interpretation of 'European modernity' (or the rise of the West)—a viewpoint criticized notably by Chibber (2013). Consequently, as Düzgün aptly argues, merely emphasizing 'multiplicity and hybridity' fails to adequately challenge unilinear and presentist conceptions of historical development (p. 44). In discussing the need to historicize modernity through a 'transdisciplinary approach', CJIR emphasizes the importance of developing a 'noninternalist and nonpresentist conception of history' (p. 17). CJIR advocates for a comprehensive exploration of the diverse experiences and pathways to modernity, recognizing the intricate interactions and influences that have molded the global landscape. The theoretical framework is eloquently elaborated in the second and third sections.

The 'Modernity, Historicity, and Transdisciplinarity' section emphasizes the need to historicize modernity through a transdisciplinary approach, avoiding presentism and assumptions about capitalism's evolutionary emergence in the West. It critiques fragmented methodologies in historical sociology, advocating for a transdisciplinary method to reveal the interactive nature of world historical development and diverse modernities. In this critique, CJIR not only addresses the culturalist and particularistic accounts mentioned above but also critiques more sophisticated intersocietal but fragmented and 'evolutionary' visions of history prevalent in IHS. This includes Michael Mann's influential Neo-Weberian model, which focuses on the differentiation of power networks (pp. 19–22), as well as Immanuel Wallerstein's World System theory, which emphasizes commercial opportunities to explain the emergence of the 'capitalist world economy' (p. 33, footnote 5).

Düzgün critiques conventional Western European historical narratives for idealizing the 'Western path to modernity', urging a reevaluation of historical insights to understand the co-constitution of social and international processes. He argues that separating economics and politics imposes modern concepts onto historical contexts, perpetuating the idea of capitalism as an eternal

force. Drawing from Karl Polanyi, Düzgün rejects the notion that capitalism gradually emerged from a timeless economic logic, instead highlighting its imposition as an unprecedented institutional framework. This framework facilitated the emergence of a market economy and delineated the economy as a distinct sphere of human activity. Düzgün advocates for a 'nonfragmented ontology' to counter methodological presentism, emphasizing a transdisciplinary approach to free disciplinary categories from presentist constraints. He suggests moving toward a 'nonpresentist' conception of capitalism's emergence, viewing it as a qualitative break rather than a transhistorical accumulation (pp. 23–25).

To this end, Düzgün fruitfully combines several theoretical frameworks and concepts such as Uneven and Combined Development (UCD), Political Marxism (PM), and the concept of Jacobinism to move beyond the problems of internalism and presentism outlined above and offers a fresh interpretation of the Turkish road to modernity.

Düzgün utilizes UCD not as a universal law but as a tool to highlight the diversity of world historical development, emphasizing the dynamic nature of the 'international'. He aims to liberate sociological imagination from viewing historical particularities as exceptions (*Sonderwegs*) to a supposed universal history, instead recognizing 'the historically changing rules of entering modernity' (p. 42). UCD is seen as an 'agency-led transformation' where less developed societies learn from and selectively adopt traits from more advanced counterparts, emphasizing the importance of active social agency as catalysts for transformation (p. 51). Düzgün critiques the UCD theory proposed by Anievas and Nişancıoğlu (2015) for reproducing the flaws of methodological presentism. While acknowledging UCD's advancements in addressing internalism and challenging conventional portrayals of bourgeois revolutions, he argues that its 'consequentialist' perspective overlooks the diversity of social forms engendered by such revolutions. He contends that this perspective simplifies bourgeois revolutionary processes, potentially leading to contradictory outcomes for capitalism's development and discounting the possibility of alternative modernities (pp. 46–47).

Düzgün maintains that PM provides a solution to these issues by conceptualizing capitalism as 'market-dependence', with a focus on political and socioinstitutional factors during its inception. PM shifts attention away from transhistorical precursors to capitalism, such as commerce, wealth, or wage labor. According to PM, capitalism emerges when both the direct producers and the appropriators of their surplus are either enabled or compelled to depend on the market for their subsistence (p. 33). As such, capitalism stands apart from other pre-capitalist modes of appropriation in that producers must engage with the market to access means of production, unlike peasants who traditionally possess land outside of market transactions. In addition, appropriators cannot depend on 'extra-economic' means of coercion through military or political power, relying instead on economic mechanisms like the market. This reliance on market dynamics establishes competition and profit maximization as the fundamental principles governing capitalist life (Wood, 2002: 2–3). This leads to the infiltration of capital into the production process and systematic transformations in living conditions (p. 49).

PM not only refrains from establishing predetermined norms for transitioning to capitalism or viewing subsequent transitions as contrasting models against favored ideal types (p. 50). It also offers a holistic framework encompassing the economic and political realms. This framework elucidates the differentiation between the political and economic spheres under capitalism and guides us in conceptualizing alternatives to capitalism while historicizing the transition to modernity without presuming a transhistorical economic rationality (p. 29). According to Düzgün, 'market-dependence signifies the minimum sociolegal prerequisites to the existence of capitalist social relations' (p. 49). In this context, Düzgün argues that UCD, coupled with PM, shifts the perspective away from regarding capitalism as an inevitable outcome, awaiting unraveling upon favorable commercial or demographic shifts. Consequently, it no longer sees multiple modernities as merely

distinct phases of covertly evolving capitalisms, but rather as a variety of endeavors aimed at emulating, selectively adopting, or entirely replacing capitalism (p. 52).

In this context, Düzgün incorporates into PM's critique of the traditional narrative of capitalism's development in early modern Europe the concept of 'Jacobinism', as conceived by Robbie Shilliam (2009). The concept of Jacobinism, here, serves as a lens to explore alternative routes to modernity that challenge the dominant narrative centered around capitalism. Düzgün examines Jacobinism as a divergent path to modernity that engendered novel social forms in contestation with capitalism. Düzgün argues that contrary to the notion of a linear transition following Britain's lead, mainland European states, notably France, exhibited unique socioeconomic structures resistant to immediate convergence with capitalist models. The geopolitical landscape, international connections, and specific socioeconomic conditions fostered diverse modernities rather than a uniform transition to capitalism. Revolutionary France, in particular, emerges as a significant alternative to capitalist modernity, posing a formidable challenge that defies simple categorization (p. 4).

Here, Düzgün largely relies on the 'revisionist historiography' of the 'social interpretation of the French Revolution' which was also embraced by some notable proponents of PM like George Comninel (1987), Ellen Meiksins Wood (1991) and Benno Teschke (2005). This 'revisionist' perspective challenges conventional views that perceive the French Revolution as a bourgeois revolution leading to capitalism's establishment in France. Instead, it suggests that French society lacked significant internal capitalist dynamics before the Revolution, and that the revolution had minimal impact on altering the prevailing non-capitalist social fabric in France (p. 5). Similarly, it expanded and solidified subsistence-oriented peasant proprietorship and introduced new forms of customary regulation in manufacturing. The commercial and industrial classes largely relied on state-provided income, rents, and careers. Consequently, the Revolution did not establish a self-regulating market or systematically commodify land and labor. Rather, it expanded state-based income, maintaining the state's central role in social reproduction. Despite generating unprecedented changes in state and economy, the Revolution provided contradictory ground for capitalism's development in France. Hence, the concept of Jacobinism is utilized to elucidate the process of (post)revolutionary French 'modernization', which, as clarified, was not instigated by nor culminated in capitalism (p. 5). Here, Düzgün astutely observes a 'gap' in the prevailing 'revisionist' literature concerning the tendency to overlook significant social changes brought about by the Revolution in the social structure of post-revolutionary France—a 'Tocquevillean' thesis long championed by conservative political thinkers and historians (see Hirschman, 1991). Thus, Düzgün asks, 'if 1789 was not a mere continuation of the absolutist past, nor could it be easily understood as a form of protocapitalism, what was to be made of its socioeconomic character and (geo)political innovations?' (p. 5).

Düzgün contends that the political and ideological shifts often associated with the French Revolution – such as universal citizenship, equality, conscription, education, and nationalism – did not directly correspond to the advancement of capitalist social relations. Instead, these changes represented alternative methods of mobilization and appropriation, signaling the emergence of a new concept of 'modernity' (p. 5). In Revolutionary France, the elite, acting through the state, introduced modern individual rights without tethering them to property ownership, in contrast to Britain. Faced with significant social and geopolitical challenges, they extended these rights to the lowest social stratum by linking them to compulsory service in the citizen-army. This departure from Britain's property-based citizenship logic established a new avenue for income and status acquisition beyond the market, via army participation. Furthermore, the French elite, encountering difficulties in subjecting peasants to capitalist market forces, opted for centralized and universal education as an alternative means to harness peasant labor and energy. Alongside the citizen-army, public schooling served as an extra-market tool to regulate and utilize peasant populations. This

approach sharply contrasted with Britain, where mobilizing the lower classes politically or culturally was deemed unnecessary for elite reproduction. In Britain, the market efficiently disciplined the poor and achieved geopolitical goals, obviating the need for extensive education beyond voluntary vocational training until the late 19th century. However, in contexts where market imperatives could not systematically dominate land and labor, universal education aimed to mobilize and utilize peasant populations through a new geopolitical (national) educational strategy (p. 7). Consequently, universal equality, conscription, and the citizen-army were not merely components of emerging capitalism or political modernity but laid the groundwork for a distinct political economy and property regime (p. 7). Hence, Revolutionary and Napoleonic France initiated 'a new mode of modernization that did not rely on the systematic commodification of the means of life', a concept defined as 'Jacobinism' (pp. 6–7).

Düzgün argues that amid social and geopolitical upheaval, Jacobinism offered alternative geo-institutional paths, shifting focus from economic production to restructuring the military and education systems. Revolutionary and Napoleonic France pioneered 'universal conscription' and 'public education', creating the 'citizen-soldier' and 'citizen-officer' who gained land and state income. Through 'mass conscription' and 'public schooling', social mobility became tied to integration into a military–educational complex, where state service, not market competition, ensured livelihoods and civic engagement. Thus, Jacobinism in France didn't replicate market-driven modernization but introduced a distinct form of modernity (p. 8).

These theoretical combinations are then used to develop a nuanced and alternative interpretation of the Ottoman and Turkish experiences of modernization, transcending traditional Eurocentric and core-periphery narratives to illuminate the complexity and diversity of paths to modernity.

The following sections are devoted to critically scrutinize conventional narratives of the Turkish road to modernity, particularly the prevalent idealized conceptions of Western European history that have shaped macro-level historical-sociological analyses of Ottoman and Turkish modernity. Düzgün challenges the notion that Turkey's modernization can be simply understood as another *Sonderweg*, or deviation from an idealized and unitary 'Western' model of modernization. Instead, the author introduces Jacobinism as a historically specific path, to show the non-capitalist and non-socialist nature of Ottoman and Turkish modernization. It is argued that Ottoman and Turkish modernization did not adhere to a singular project of 'Westernization', but rather selectively appropriated, oscillated between, and recombined with local social resources, presenting a unique project of modernity.

This approach is applied across different historical periods in the case study, such as the Ottoman Empire, the early Republican period, and the post-World War II era, to demonstrate the intricate and multifaceted nature of Turkey's modernization. While Düzgün's analysis draws on empirical findings from existing historical-sociological accounts of the Turkish 'road' to modernity, it presents a novel interpretation that challenges some prevalent theoretical assumptions about Turkish modernization. Düzgün argues that analyses of Ottoman and Turkish modernity, while rich in empirical data, were shaped by idealized views of Western European history, using Western capitalist development as a benchmark for assessing Ottoman and Turkish modernity. This led to the perception of peculiarities in the Turkish 'path' to modernity, such as 'capitalism from above', 'conservative' modernization, 'peripheral' capitalism, and an 'incomplete' bourgeois revolution. However, these notions were extrapolated from a reference point lacking historical validity, as even the most 'archetypal' cases of bourgeois revolution and capitalist development, such as England and France, significantly diverged from conventional narratives of the 'rise of the West'.

By applying insights from PM, Düzgün challenges these perspectives and offers a new periodization of the transition to capitalism in Turkey. His analysis emphasizes that there was no transition to capitalism in Turkey until the 1950s, highlighting the non-capitalist path taken by the late

Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic toward modernity. He argues that the prevailing economic structures and property relations did not exhibit the characteristics of a capitalist system. Instead, he highlights the need for a radical transformation in dominant relations and institutions of private property for true capitalist development to take place. Through this theoretical lens, Düzgün reevaluates the historical trajectory of capitalist development in Turkey. By reframing the understanding of capitalism and emphasizing the absence of key capitalist features in the economic organization of the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic, Düzgün offers a new perspective on the historical trajectory of economic development in Turkey.

Düzgün analyzes Ottoman modernization from 1839 to 1918, highlighting simultaneous capitalist and Jacobin projects aimed at establishing equal political subjecthood while restructuring social relations (p. 99). Tanzimat reforms initiated this complex process, resulting in competing claims on land, peasant unrest, and efforts to balance rights. On one hand, they aimed to modernize by strengthening the fiscal base, signing free trade agreements, and enacting laws guaranteeing equality and property rights (p. 110). The Land Code of 1858 facilitated privatization of land, fostering an agricultural boom and smallholding peasant expansion. However, Düzgün notes the state's failure to shift peasant production from subsistence to commodity-oriented (p. 110).

The reforms faced challenges from competing land claims, peasant unrest, and tax collection collapse, failing to establish a landlord/merchant land monopoly and integrate sharecropping peasants into market imperatives. Despite active market participation, neither peasants nor landlords could drive capitalist growth in the Ottoman countryside. Landlords intensified exploitation amid market competition, stalling productive forces, limiting investment, and stagnating productivity rates, with private property emerging without overriding peasants' subsistence rights. Commercial landholdings expanded due to rising world market prices like cotton but didn't significantly shift agriculture toward market dependence. As Ottoman experimentation with market society ended, the elite embraced a Jacobin project for political unity. From 1905, the Young Turk vision evolved due to domestic uprisings and geopolitical shifts, with the Russian revolution particularly shifting their outlook to revolutionary activism, recognizing the potential of guiding peasant and urban poor for change (p. 140).

The 1908 Young Turk Revolution redirected focus toward national welfare, prioritizing economic relations within the nation rather than market reliance. Military service and public education replaced market mechanisms, fostering a communal property system termed 'National economics'. This approach enriched a 'Turkified' bourgeoisie while ensuring land and subsistence for all citizens based on patriotism, reshaping the socioeconomic structure toward a unique 'Jacobin political economy'. The Young Turks' ability to challenge the sultan and upper bureaucracy depended on their adeptness in rallying the lower classes, integrating their demands into an essentially elitist-conservative governance approach (p. 261). Despite embodying capitalist and proletarian elements, reliance on lower-class mobilization hindered capitalist goals. By 1914, wars and rebellions led to the collapse of capitalist efforts, prompting a communal approach to property to maintain authority. Social reproduction shifted to the Turkish nation, with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) emphasizing service and sacrifice for national progress. This period (1839–1918) marked extensive endeavors diverging from both capitalism and socialism (p. 159).

The section 'Kemalism as the Ultimate Turkish Substitution for Capitalism (1923–1945)' explores how the Turkish Revolution of 1908–1923 laid the groundwork for Kemalism, a sociopolitical ideology developed by the Kemalist elite in response to challenges during their rise to power. Düzgün argues that after a decade of warfare from World War I to the War of Independence's end in 1922, land disputes intensified with the Republic's establishment in 1923. Muslim landlords seizing land from non-Muslims sparked conflicts with incoming immigrants, pushing many into sharecropping due to heavy indebtedness. This posed economic and political challenges, fueled by

memories of peasant involvement in the Bolshevik Revolution. Under external pressures, the Kemalist elite adopted a people-centric approach to engage with the Soviets and counter socialism during the War of Independence. Post-war, Kemalist populism evolved, acknowledging encounters with socialism but emphasizing national unity over class differences. The early Republic formulated a people-centric ideology, shaping a new bourgeois order and turning 'people-ism' into a conservative force (p. 187).

Düzgün argues that the original Kemalist experiment (1923–1945) wasn't state capitalism but a unique form of Jacobinism. Property rights in the Turkish Republic prioritized national service over productivity, shaping social reproduction around military and political duties rather than labor (p. 262). The new state replaced market relations inherited from the Young Turk Revolution with a hybrid political economy, using universal conscription and education as substitutes for capitalist property. These measures, alongside Kemalist cultural expressions, extended the Ottoman Jacobin project. The state elite emphasized education, Turkification, secularization, and militarization for social reproduction, solidifying core principles like etatism and nationalism. Kemalism thus represented a distinct response to Turkey's historical conditions of comparative backwardness (p. 188).

In the final chapter, 'Reinterpreting Capitalist Modernity à la Turca', the author offers a detailed analysis of post-World War II Turkey's transition to capitalism. By situating Turkey's capitalist evolution within the global post-war context, the chapter sheds light on the country's economic and political transformations. Düzgün explores how Turkey's internal development was shaped by the shift to a bipolar world order, culminating in the establishment of capitalist property relations in the 1950s with U.S. support. This marked the decline of Jacobinism and the ascendancy of capitalism in Turkey. The Kemalist project, initially aimed at modernization, spawned diverse interpretations, including the Islamic National View Movement (NVM) in Anatolian towns during the 1970s. The NVM introduced a new capitalist development strategy, signaling the end of capitalism's coexistence with Jacobinism. With the rise of the AKP, an offshoot of the NVM, in 2002, Kemalist modernity was either abandoned or reinterpreted to serve an authoritarian Islamic agenda. While initial neoliberal reforms in the 1980s led to social exclusion, subsequent measures in the 2000s provided social benefits, boosting the AKP's popularity. However, these services are often outsourced to private entities and charity groups undermining true social citizenship rights. Despite welfare expansions, tying material well-being to capitalist norms under AKP rule signifies a shift in citizenship rights.

In sum, Düzgün contends that the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic forged a unique path to modernity, characterized by distinct economic structures and property relations. Despite the presence of private property, they diverged from typical capitalist norms, failing to establish a market-dependent society. Rather than fitting neatly into categories like patrimonial state or peripheral capitalism, Düzgün suggests they embraced a historical Jacobinism, blending elements of capitalism and socialism through alternative property and social organization (p. 102). Kemalism, stemming from Jacobinism, prioritizes innovative concepts of space and subjectivity over capitalist ideals. In contrast, the emerging Ottoman commonwealth and AKP rule exhibit traits of universal capitalism, which ultimately subject human existence and values to commodification (p. 256).

CJIR undoubtedly provides a valuable corrective to those accounts in the historical sociology of Turkish modernity, which, from Metin Heper and Şerif Mardin to Nilüfer Göle, Büşra Ersanlı-Behar, Murat Belge, Mete Tunçay, Taha Parla, Levent Köker, Erik Jan Zürcher and Ellen Kay Trimberger, have emphasized the significance of the 'weak' Turkish bourgeoisie in explaining the underdeveloped state of civil society, the illiberal nature of economic and political institutions, and the dominant role played by bureaucratic cadres in the modernization processes.

Moreover, CJIR's depiction of Kemalist Jacobinism offers a crucial corrective to prevailing 'post-Kemalist' views. While post-Kemalist literature acknowledges the Kemalist experience as a form of Jacobin model, it often does so disparagingly, associating it with the authoritarian implementation of secularism by the regime. Rooted in linear and presentist interpretations of European history, post-Kemalist perspectives frequently depict the Kemalist era as diverging Turkey's modernization from a path toward liberal democracy. In this context, CJIR stands out as a pioneering effort, providing a 'post-post Kemalist' (for a detailed account of this concept see Aytürk, 2015) perspective on the founding period of the Turkish Republic and Turkey's broader modern history. In doing so, it rectifies the commonly held, albeit mistaken, notion that Kemalist Jacobinism was the primary force diverting Turkish modernity from the purportedly normative liberal path toward democracy, consequently portraying it as the chief catalyst of illiberal Turkish modernization. While CJIR provides valuable insights, it could have enhanced its impact by situating its 'transdisciplinary' approach within the emerging 'post-post-Kemalism paradigm', a concept that has sparked significant debate in Turkish studies since its introduction by Aytürk in 2015.

Conversely, the concept of Jacobinism is occasionally expanded beyond its original meaning of guiding 'revolutionary political projects'. For instance, Düzgün's depiction of the Young Turks' vision of change and the French Revolution reveals certain limitations in labeling them as Jacobins. As Düzgün points out, the Young Turks upheld an elitist and 'scientific' societal vision, wary of revolutionary change and advocating for scientific thought over popular action to achieve personal freedom and establish a constitution. They emphasized the importance of revolutionizing education, industry, and knowledge rather than inciting street protests, fearing the potential for chaos to invite foreign intervention or despotism's return in the Ottoman context. They admired Japan's transformation through 'scientific' methods, believing that a swift and bloodless military coup, coupled with mass education, could replace the violent methods of the French Revolution and avoid the pitfalls of mass participation (p. 138). This emphasis on changing the regime without a revolution, a paramount concern for the Young Turk circles, underscores the limitations of considering their activity as Jacobin. Overall, while the concept of Jacobinism is utilized effectively, its conceptualization could be strengthened by not solely relying on Robbie Shilliam's (2009) interpretation, which is heavily influenced by 'revisionist historiography' of the French Revolution. Instead, it should also consider the broader discussion of revolutionary politics, particularly as employed by early Soviet leaders who traced their political heritage back to the revolutionary Jacobin tradition that emerged during the French Revolution (see Hoffmann, 2011; Suny, 2011; Traverso, 2021).

Another notable strength of CJIR lies in its ability to elucidate the diverse pathways to modernity while avoiding the pitfall of what can be termed as 'Eurocentrism in Reverse'. This inclination, commonly observed in postcolonial-influenced approaches, tends to portray traders or merchants as potential or actual capitalists regardless of context. According to this perspective, regions across Asia, Africa, and the Americas were deemed to be advancing toward capitalism before European imperialism, only to have their progression impeded in various ways (Wood, 2001). While Düzgün has already addressed this inclination as part of the problem of 'presentism', further elaboration on this insight could enhance reader understanding, particularly under the concept of 'Eurocentric Anti-Eurocentrism'.

Despite its evident strengths, CJIR's insistence on divorcing modernity from capitalism and Jacobin practices from capitalist modernity raises also some questions and limitations. As noted by Düzgün, CJIR implies that 'it was not capitalism but Jacobinism that introduced the majority of the world to the relations and institutions of modernity' (p. 264). Yet, the mechanical separation of Jacobinism from the history of capitalist development may prove unnecessary, or even unhelpful, given the focus on the geopolitical pressures that drive ruling classes in non-capitalist states toward embracing capitalist modernization amid the uneven and combined development of capitalism.

Furthermore, as Düzgün rightly points out, 'the consolidation of capitalist social relations hardly requires or presupposes the introduction of liberal political institutions. A diversity of regimes, state forms, and ruling-class alliances are perfectly compatible with securing bourgeois predominance in political life' (p. 191). In addition, Düzgün acknowledges, referencing Wood (1998: 30), that once capitalism takes root in a particular country, its trajectory diverges significantly from its original path, reshaping all other societies and leading to continuous alterations in economic development conditions as capitalist imperatives expand (p. 49). Düzgün further recognizes (p. 50) that 'depending on past socioinstitutional legacies and the timing and international context of capitalist transition, the mechanisms that ensure market-dependence take different forms. The socioinstitutional content of market-dependence is not fixed but cumulatively changes'. Moreover, Düzgün rightly acknowledges that while capitalist exploitation doesn't always rely on direct coercion, threats of unemployment and dispossession sustain capitalist appropriation. Indeed, non-economic coercion like legally coerced labor and authoritarian social control are common, along with imperialist interventions. In capitalism, economic and political powers are tightly integrated, with profitability dictating resource allocation and state interventions essential for market economies (p. 31).

These insightful remarks suggest that even if we accept 'market-dependence' as a defining characteristic of capitalism, Jacobin novel forms of modernization can still be viewed as part, rather than an alternative, unfolding of capitalist modernity. Hence, Turkish modernization can be interpreted within the framework of capitalist development without succumbing to a linear and presentist conception of historical development. In this context, discussing the 1923 İzmir Economic Congress, which the book unfortunately overlooks, could elucidate the connection between Kemalist Jacobinism and the development of capitalism in Turkey. For example, the 1923 İzmir Economic Congress advocated for an expanded state role in the economy, promoting domestic businesses, boosting local production, stimulating growth, and fostering a national bourgeoisie. This economic agenda aimed to empower Muslim and Turkish elements, leading to the economic purge of non-Muslims (see Çetinkaya, 2014, 2024; Toprak, 2019). The emerging Muslim/Turkish bourgeoisie, encouraged by state elites, established national companies and banks, consolidating their economic influence. The National Economy program aligned with the objectives of Muslimization/Turkification and served the interests of this bourgeoisie. Under the National Economy ideology, efforts to establish national companies and banks were spearheaded by Muslim/Turkish merchants, notables, and entrepreneurs in Anatolia. This initiative arose from the necessity for the Muslim/Turkish landowner class, mainly involved in exporting agricultural products, to strengthen their competitive edge and transition into an entrepreneurial class. This transformation included lowering product prices and broadening their commercial engagements (Aytekin, 2021; Çetinkaya, 2024).

This interpretation could be facilitated by adopting a broader conceptualization of capitalism – not to the extent of falling into the trap of 'presentism' and overlooking capitalism's historical distinctiveness (unique structure of class relations) as a mode of production – seeing it 'not as a system of market compulsion, but as one of *competitive accumulation based on wage-labor*' (Davidson, 2005: 21). Indeed, many renowned scholars, such as Blackbourn and Eley (1984), who played a pioneering role in challenging the German *Sonderweg* thesis advocated by the Bielefeld School in German historiography, have succeeded in transcending linear and presentist conceptions of European history while embracing a 'consequentialist' concept of bourgeois revolution within the context of the uneven and combined development of capitalism.[1] In this context, the attempt to separate capitalism from modernity does not appear to be a logical conclusion stemming from the necessity to transcend presentist and internalist conceptions of history; rather, it seems to be motivated by a preference for interpreting 'revisionist' accounts of the French

Revolution as inherently superior (for a critique of the 'revisionist' historiography on the English and French revolutions see Haynes and Wolfreys, 2007; Losurdo, 2015; Traverso, 2021). It's interesting to note that some of the most acclaimed 'revisionist' scholars of the French Revolution, such as François Furet (1981), paradoxically reinforce a presentist and linear view of history. They perceive the French Revolution as a mistake, arguing that the emergence of modern liberalism did not necessitate such violent upheaval. Although Düzgün clearly distances himself from this conservative perspective on revolutions, he still aligns with one key assertion of 'revisionist' historiography: the belief that the French Revolution is disconnected from the development of capitalist modernity.

Nevertheless, despite these limitations, CJIR stands as a significant contribution to the literature. In sum, *Capitalism, Jacobinism, and International Relations: Revisiting Turkish Modernity* skillfully integrates the latest insights from historical sociology into Turkish Studies, providing readers with an innovative, analytically rigorous, and compelling account of the 'peculiarities' of Turkey's path to modernity.

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1. Recently, Çağdaş Sümer (2023) published a similar study examining the relationship between political conflict dynamics and state formation in the 19th-century Ottoman Empire within the context of class struggle. Titled 'Düzenini arayan Osmanlı' (The Ottoman Empire in Search of Its Order), this research shares with *Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations: Revisiting Turkish Modernity* (CJIR) the goal of challenging presentist and linear views of history while adopting a consequentialist perspective on bourgeois revolution.

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