Türk Kültürü ve **Hacı Bektaş Velî** Araştırma Dergisi,
Yaz-Ağustos 2026, Sayı Özel, 355-379

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
(CC BY-NC 4.0)

MAKALE ARTICLE
ISSN: 1306-8253 eISSN: 2147-9895
Geliş Tarihi/Received: 26 Mayıs 2025
Kabul Tarihi/Accepted: 18 Haziran 2026
https://doi.org/10.60163/tkhcbva.1706271

FĀRĀBĪ, MĀTURĪDĪ AND AḤMAD YASAWĪ'S UNDERSTANDING OF EDUCATION IN THE TURKESTAN TURKISH-ISLAMIC TRADITION

TÜRKİSTAN TÜRK-İSLAM DÜŞÜNCESİNDE FÂRÂBÎ, MÂTÜRÎDÎ VE AHMED YESEVÎ'NİN EĞİTİM ANLAYIŞI

RECAİ DOĞAN*
Sorumlu Yazar
DİLNOZA RAHMATİLLAEVA**

Abstract

Contemporary education systems often face a tension between exam-oriented expectations and the aim of integrating cognitive development with moral, social, and spiritual formation. This study examines the educationally relevant ideas found in the works of Fārābī and Māturīdī and in the *Dīwān-i Ḥikmat* tradition associated with Aḥmad Yasawī within their historical and intellectual contexts. It aims to identify their principal concepts, shared concerns, and differences and to assess their historical relevance to contemporary educational debates. The study employs qualitative document analysis. Its primary sources are Fārābī's *al-Madīnat al-Fāḍila* and *Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda*, Māturīdī's *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* and *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*, and the *Dīwān-i Ḥikmat*. The findings reveal three distinct approaches to human formation. Fārābī relates education to happiness, virtue, practical competence, and civic cooperation. Māturīdī's theological and exegetical discussions connect human formation with reason, revelation, free choice, knowledge, action, and justice. The Yasawī tradition emphasises the disciplining of the *nafs*, servitude, intention, action, poetic counsel, and spiritual guidance. These perspectives do not offer directly transferable educational models, but they provide historically grounded resources for discussing educational purpose, moral formation, and the relationship between knowledge and conduct.

Keywords: Philosophy of Education, Fārābī, Māturīdī, Aḥmad Yasawī, Turkestan Turkish-Islamic Intellectual Tradition.

Öz

Günümüz eğitim sistemlerinde sınav odaklı beklentiler ile bilişsel gelişimi ahlaki, toplumsal ve manevi oluşumla bütünleştirme amacı arasında bir gerilim bulunmaktadır. Bu araştırma, Fârâbî ve Mâtürîdî'nin eserleri ile Ahmed Yesevî'ye nispet edilen *Dîvân-ı Hikmet* geleneğinde yer alan eğitim açısından anlamlı görüşleri kendi tarihsel ve fikrî bağlamları içinde incelemektedir. Çalışmanın amacı, bu düşünce dünyalarında öne çıkan kavramları, ortak ilgileri ve farklılıkları belirlemek ve bunların günümüz eğitim tartışmaları bakımından tarihsel

Araştırma Makalesi / Künye: DOĞAN, Recai - Dilnoza RAHMATİLLAEVA. "Fārābī, Māturīdī and Aḥmad Yasawī's Understanding of Education in the Turkestan Turkish-Islamic Tradition". Türk Kültürü ve Hacı Bektaş Veli Araştırma Dergisi, Özel Sayı 1 (Ağustos 2026), s. 355-379. https://doi.org/10.60163/tkhcbva.1706271

* Prof. Dr., Ankara University, Faculty of Divinity, Department of Religious Education, E-mail: rdogan@divinity.ankara.edu.tr, ORCID ID: 0000-0001-9668-4563

** Dr., Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University, Faculty of Theology, E-mail: dilnoza.rakhmatillaeva@manas.edu.kg, ORCID ID: 0009-0005-2432-6800

önemini değerlendirmektir. Araştırmada nitel doküman incelemesi yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Birincil kaynakları Fârâbî'nin *el-Medînetü'l-Fâzıla* ve *Tahsîlü's-Saʿâde*, Mâtürîdî'nin *Kitâbü't-Tevhîd* ve *Teʾvîlâtü'l-Kurʾân* adlı eserleri ile *Dîvân-ı Hikmet* oluşturmaktadır. Bulgular, insanın oluşumuna ilişkin üç farklı yaklaşım ortaya koymaktadır. Fârâbî eğitimi mutluluk, erdem, amelî yetkinlik ve toplumsal iş birliğiyle ilişkilendirir. Mâtürîdî'nin kelami ve tefsirî açıklamalarında akıl, vahiy, özgür tercih, bilgi, eylem ve adalet öne çıkar. Yesevî geleneğinde ise nefis terbiyesi, kulluk, niyet, eylem, şiirsel öğüt ve manevi rehberlik belirgindir. Bu yaklaşımlar doğrudan uygulanabilir eğitim modelleri sunmasa da eğitimin amacı, ahlaki oluşum ve bilgi–davranış ilişkisi üzerine tarihsel bir düşünme zemini sağlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Eğitim Felsefesi, Fârâbî, Mâtürîdî, Ahmed Yesevî, Türkistan Türk-İslam Düşünce Geleneği.

Introduction

Across OECD countries and other participating systems, national or central assessments and examinations are widely used. OECD data show that national or central assessments are more prevalent at primary and lower secondary levels, while more than three-quarters of OECD countries have national or central examinations in the final years of upper secondary education (OECD, 2023, 404–406). These data document the widespread use of assessment instruments, but do not by themselves establish that curricula are uniformly reduced to testing. Biesta argues that an increasing emphasis on the measurement and comparison of educational outcomes can displace questions concerning the purposes and direction of education (Biesta, 2009, 33–35). He distinguishes qualification, socialisation, and subjectification as three different but interrelated functions of education (Biesta, 2009, 39–41). Peterson argues that character formation and expression require attention to the relationship between the moral and the political, since individuals are intimately connected with their social associations (Peterson, 2020, 143). The 2021 report of the International Commission on the Futures of Education calls for pedagogy organised around cooperation, collaboration, and solidarity, directed toward the development of students' intellectual, social, and moral capacities, while affirming education as a public endeavour and a common good (International Commission on the Futures of Education, 2021, 2, 4). Taken together, these approaches raise a central question for contemporary education: how can cognitive achievement be integrated with moral, social, and relational formation?

In the Turkish context, the secondary-school transition system continues to raise concerns about examination pressure and competition. TEDMEM's *2022 Education Evaluation Report* notes that reducing pressure on students and limiting competition were among the stated purposes of the transition system, but argues that the existing central examination does not adequately fulfil its intended selection function (TEDMEM, 2023, 11). At the same time, the *Türkiye Yüzyılı Maarif Modeli Öğretim Programları Ortak Metni*, issued by the Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı (MEB), identifies the cultivation of the "competent and virtuous person" as its ultimate aim, adopts a holistic conception that seeks the balanced development of the student's bodily, intellectual, moral, emotional, spiritual, and social dimensions, and integrates values into curricula through the Virtue–Value–Action Framework (MEB, 2025, 5, 35–36). Taken together, these two tendencies indicate not a simple absence of values from education, but a continuing tension between examination-oriented expectations and an explicit policy commitment to integrating knowledge, skills, dispositions, and values. This tension makes it relevant to reconsider historical approaches that treated education as the formation of the whole person.

Across several major philosophical traditions, education has been understood not only as the transmission of knowledge but also as a means of personal, moral, and social formation. In the *Republic*, Plato discusses education in connection with the formation of the city's guardians (Platon, 2018, II–III, 376e–412b). He later relates justice in the individual to the proper ordering of the rational, spirited, and appetitive parts of the soul (Platon, 2018, IV, 441c–444a). In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle relates the human good to activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. He distinguishes intellectual virtue, which develops principally through teaching, from moral virtue, which is formed through habituation (Aristoteles, 2020, I.7, 1098a16–18; II.1, 1103a14–18). In the *Lunyu*, learning is linked with the continued practice of what has been learned. The text also relates harmony to the observance of *li* (ritual propriety) and defines *ren* (humaneness) in terms of overcoming the self and returning to *li* (Konfüçyüs, 2021, 1.1, 1.12, 12.1). Although these traditions differ substantially in their philosophical assumptions, each connects education or learning with the formation of the person and life with others, rather than with the accumulation of information alone.

Islamic educational thought likewise connects education with individual development, social and moral formation, and knowledge. Halstead analyses Islamic education through three dimensions: aiding individual development, increasing understanding of society and its social and moral rules, and transmitting knowledge (Halstead, 2004, 522–523). Historical research on Mamluk Cairo further shows that higher religious education was not confined to madrasas: instruction took place in madrasas, mosques, and *khānqāhs*, whose activities often overlapped, while the institutions established to support education followed no single pattern (Berkey, 1992, 15–17). Rosenthal argues that *ʿilm* occupied a central position across the intellectual, religious, political, and everyday dimensions of Muslim civilization (Rosenthal, 2006, 1–2). Taken together, these studies do not establish one unchanging Islamic educational model; rather, they reveal a broad tradition in which knowledge, moral conduct, religious practice, and social relations were brought into connection in different institutional and intellectual contexts.

Within the wider intellectual geography of Turkestan and Transoxiana, the relations among knowledge, moral formation, religious practice, and social life took different philosophical, theological, and Sufi forms. Research on Samarkand during Māturīdī's period describes a diverse scholarly environment that included mosques, madrasas, scholars' houses, and *ribāṭs*, while associating Māturīdī directly with *Dār al-Jūzjāniyya* as a centre in which he studied and taught (Aydınlı, 2019, 587–594). Necdet Tosun's introductory study states that, after completing his spiritual education, Aḥmad Yasawī established a *dergāh* in Yasī, where he provided religious and moral guidance and communicated his Sufi ideas through simple Turkish poems; these poems were conveyed by his dervishes to distant Turkish communities (Tosun, 2017, 14–16). In a separate section, drawing largely on later Yasawī sources, Tosun describes more fully articulated practices of initiation, vocal remembrance, retreat, spiritual conversation, authorisation, and service (Tosun, 2017, 34–38). These sources indicate the presence of varied scholarly and spiritual settings, but they do not justify reconstructing the region as a single standardised educational system or as an unqualified madrasa–tekke partnership. The present study therefore approaches Fārābī, Māturīdī, and Aḥmad Yasawī as three distinct philosophical, theological, and Sufi articulations associated with the wider Turkestan Turkish-Islamic intellectual tradition. This comparative framework preserves the differences among their periods, textual genres, intellectual

frameworks, and degrees of explicit engagement with educational concepts.

Accordingly, the aim of this study is to examine the educational understandings of Fārābī, Māturīdī, and Aḥmad Yasawī within their historical and intellectual contexts, to analyse the concepts they employed and the principles reflected in their works, and to consider the historically situated relevance of these approaches to contemporary educational debates. The scope of the study is limited to the philosophical, theological, and Sufi frameworks within which the educationally relevant ideas of the three thinkers are examined; detailed pedagogical practices outside these frameworks are excluded. The study examines selected primary works together with relevant historical and modern scholarship and compares the resulting data under four themes: the conception of the human being and the purpose of education; knowledge, wisdom, and the learning process; virtue, morality, and social order; and educational methods and institutional structures. Because the three bodies of writing differ in genre and in the extent to which they formulate educational concepts explicitly, the analysis distinguishes direct textual statements from interpretive educational reconstructions.

1. Research Problem

As established in the introduction, the contemporary educational context is characterised not by a simple absence of values, but by a tension between examination-oriented expectations and efforts to integrate knowledge, skills, dispositions, and values. This tension raises the question of how education can address cognitive, moral, social, and spiritual formation without being reduced to measurable outcomes alone.

In this context, the works of Fārābī and Māturīdī and the Dīwān-i Ḥikmat tradition associated with Aḥmad Yasawī offer distinct philosophical, theological, and Sufi perspectives on human formation, knowledge, virtue, conduct, and social order. These sources differ in genre and in the extent to which they formulate educational concepts explicitly. The study therefore examines both direct textual formulations and educational implications reconstructed from the selected works, while preserving the differences among their historical and intellectual frameworks. The research problem is how these three bodies of thought can be examined comparatively and how their educationally relevant dimensions can be brought into dialogue with contemporary educational debates without treating them as directly transferable models.

Within this framework, the research questions of the study are as follows:

1. Which concepts relevant to human formation and education are prominent in the works and traditions associated with Fārābī, Māturīdī, and Aḥmad Yasawī, and how do these concepts acquire meaning within their respective historical, cultural, and intellectual contexts?

2. What shared concerns and significant differences emerge among the three accounts regarding the conception of the human being and the purpose of education; knowledge, wisdom, and learning; virtue, morality, and social order; and educational methods and institutional structures? How are these differences related to their respective philosophical, theological, and Sufi frameworks?

3. Which dimensions of these historically situated approaches can be brought into dialogue with contemporary educational debates without being presented as direct prescriptions for present-day educational institutions and practices?

These questions determine the thematic structure of the analysis and the scope of the discussion**.**

2. Research Aim and Significance

The main aim of this study is to examine the educational understandings associated with Fārābī, Māturīdī, and Aḥmad Yasawī within their historical, cultural, and intellectual contexts; to compare the concepts, shared concerns, and differences identified in the selected texts; and to discuss the historically situated relevance of these findings to contemporary educational debates.

Within this framework, the sub-objectives of the research are as follows:

- To identify the concepts relevant to human formation and education in the works and traditions associated with Fārābī, Māturīdī, and Aḥmad Yasawī and to explain their meanings within their respective historical, cultural, and intellectual contexts.
- To compare the three accounts under the themes of the conception of the human being and the purpose of education; knowledge, wisdom, and the learning process; virtue, morality, and social order; and educational methods and institutional structures.
- To identify their shared concerns and significant differences while relating these findings to their respective philosophical, theological, and Sufi frameworks.
- To assess which dimensions of these approaches may contribute a historically grounded perspective to contemporary educational debates, without treating them as directly transferable educational models.

The significance of the study lies in bringing three distinct bodies of thought associated with the wider Turkestan Turkish-Islamic intellectual tradition into a common comparative framework while preserving their conceptual and historical differences. Fārābī relates happiness and human perfection to theoretical, deliberative, and moral virtues, practical arts, and cooperation within the virtuous city; he also distinguishes instruction from moral and practical formation (Fārābī, 2001, 79–80; 2018, 1, 31–33). Māturīdī identifies perception, reports, and inference as routes to knowledge, relates religious knowledge to reason and transmitted guidance, and describes wisdom as encompassing knowledge and action (Māturīdī, 2014, 40–51; 2018, 8: 241–242). In the Dīwān-i Ḥikmat tradition, knowledge is evaluated through intention and action, while human formation is connected with the disciplining of the nafs, spiritual guidance, and moral conduct (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 58, 169–170, 228, 425–426). These accounts do not constitute three equivalent or equally explicit theories of education. Their comparative value lies in showing how questions of human formation are articulated within philosophical, theological, and Sufi frameworks.

In this respect, the study's contribution is primarily historical, comparative, and theoretical. It does not seek to derive ready-made curricula, institutional models, or policy prescriptions from classical sources. Rather, it offers a historically grounded framework for discussing educational purpose, the relationship between knowledge and conduct, moral formation, social order, and methods of guidance.

The significance of the research can be summarised under three points:

- Comparative contribution: Rather than claiming the complete absence of previous studies, this research brings Fārābī, Māturīdī, and Aḥmad Yasawī together within a single four-theme analytical framework (for earlier studies on Fārābī's educational thought, see Aydın, 2010, 123–150; Toprak, 2020, 136–149; Yeşilçayır, 2021, 52–64). Earlier studies have also examined

Māturīdī's Qurʾānic interpretations from an educational perspective (see Tunçpınar, 2014, 229–250). The present study makes the shared concerns and differences among the three bodies of thought visible without reducing their philosophical, theological, and Sufi perspectives to a single educational model.

- Conceptual contribution: The study distinguishes explicit formulations concerning teaching and formation from educational implications reconstructed from theological, exegetical, and Sufi texts. This distinction provides a more precise basis for comparing concepts such as happiness, reason, revelation, wisdom, virtue, self-discipline, moral conduct, and social order.
- Contemporary relevance: The study offers historically situated perspectives that may enrich discussions concerning educational purpose, values, moral formation, social responsibility, and the relation between knowledge and action. These perspectives are presented as resources for reflection rather than as directly applicable recommendations for contemporary educational policies, curricula, or teacher-training programmes.

3. Research Method

This study employed qualitative document analysis. Document analysis is a systematic procedure involving the identification, selection, appraisal, and synthesis of data contained in written documents (Bowen, 2009, 27–29). This design was selected because the research questions require the contextual interpretation of concepts and arguments in philosophical, theological, exegetical, and Sufi texts rather than the collection of data from human participants.

The primary corpus consisted of the following Turkish editions and translations actually used in the analysis:

- Fārābī, al-Madīnat al-Fāḍila, translated by Nafiz Danışman, 4th ed. (Ankara: Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001).
- Fārābī, Mutluluğun Kazanılması (Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda), translated from Arabic by Ahmet Arslan, 3rd ed. (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2018).
- Māturīdī, Kitâbü't-Tevhîd: Açıklamalı Tercüme, translated by Bekir Topaloğlu, 6th ed. (Istanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2014).
- Māturīdī, Teʾvîlâtü'l-Kurʾân Tercümesi, edited by Yusuf Şevki Yavuz and translated by Bekir Topaloğlu et al., 17 vols. (Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2015–2019).
- Aḥmad Yasawī, Dīwān-i Ḥikmat, edited by Mustafa Tatcı, with the hikmats rendered into Turkish by Hayati Bice (Ankara: Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Uluslararası Türk-Kazak Üniversitesi, 2017).

The analysis drew on the volumes and passages of these works that were relevant to the research questions and the four analytical themes. Secondary scholarship did not replace the primary conceptual corpus; it was used to establish historical and institutional contexts that could not be demonstrated from the primary texts alone. In particular, Aydınlı's study was used to examine the scholarly environment of Samarkand and Māturīdī's association with Dār al-Jūzjāniyya, while Tosun's introductory study was used to distinguish the historical activity associated with Aḥmad Yasawī from practices documented in the later Yasawī tradition.

The works were selected according to the following criteria:

1. Their relevance to the philosophical, theological, and Sufi frameworks compared in the study.

2. Their direct relevance to one or more of the research themes: the conception of the human being and the purpose of education; knowledge, wisdom, and the learning process; virtue, morality, and social order; and educational methods and institutional structures.

3. Their capacity to provide either explicit textual evidence concerning education and human formation or a clearly bounded basis for interpretive reconstruction.

4. Their availability in scholarly Turkish editions or translations with stable pagination and verifiable bibliographical information.

The units of analysis consisted of passages that explicitly addressed one or more of the research themes or provided a contextually defensible basis for examining educationally relevant concepts. Passages unrelated to the research questions, repetitions that added no new conceptual or contextual content, and technical discussions without a discernible connection to the themes were excluded. Passages were not classified as educational merely because modern pedagogical terminology could be imposed on them. Where the sources did not formulate an explicit educational theory, the findings were presented as interpretive reconstructions derived from philosophical, theological, exegetical, or Sufi discussions. These reconstructions were distinguished throughout the analysis from concepts and statements directly formulated in the texts.

A further source-critical distinction was applied to the Dīwān-i Ḥikmat. Tosun's introductory study in the 2017 edition notes that extant collections differ in both language and content, that the hikmats may have been written or compiled by different persons, and that the corpus was altered and supplemented over time (Tosun, 2017, 18; see also Tosun, 2000, 123). Findings derived from these texts were therefore generally attributed to "the Dīwān-i Ḥikmat tradition associated with Aḥmad Yasawī" rather than automatically being presented as the verbatim and historically certain statements of Aḥmad Yasawī himself.

Unless otherwise indicated, the English renderings of passages quoted in the article were prepared from the cited Turkish editions. Quotations were checked against the wording, context, volume, and page of the editions used.

The documentary data were analysed thematically. The four main themes were established deductively from the research questions at the beginning of the analysis:

1. Conception of the Human Being and the Purpose of Education
2. Knowledge, Wisdom, and the Learning Process
3. Virtue, Morality, and Social Order
4. Methods and Institutional Structures in Education

Although the main themes were determined in advance, their internal distinctions and contextual subcategories were refined through repeated engagement with the texts. Relevant passages were examined together with their immediate and broader contexts and were assigned to the themes according to their analytical function. Each body of thought was first analysed separately. The findings were then compared to identify shared concerns and significant differences without assuming that the three bodies of thought employed identical concepts or represented equivalent forms of

educational theory. Representative passages and, where appropriate, short quotations were selected only after their wording, context, edition, volume, and page references had been verified.

The analysis was therefore deductive at the level of the four main themes while remaining open to contextual distinctions within those themes. This procedure maintained correspondence among the research questions, the organisation of the findings, and the subsequent comparative discussion. It also prevented concepts identified in one body of thought from being automatically transferred to the other two.

To strengthen the trustworthiness of the analysis, relevant passages were read repeatedly, each interpretation was checked against its surrounding context, and the fit between the data and the assigned theme was reviewed by returning to the source texts. Bibliographical information, quotations, volume and page references, and the distinction between direct textual statements and interpretive reconstructions were rechecked. Claims that could not be supported by the specified edition and page were revised or excluded. These procedures are consistent with Nowell et al.'s emphasis on immersion in the data, iterative review of themes, transparent documentation of analytical decisions, and sufficiently detailed reporting of the analytical process (Nowell et al., 2017, 3–4, 8–10).

The study involved no human participants, personal data, interviews, observations, or experimental intervention; its data consisted exclusively of published documents. Under the institutional procedures applicable to the study, ethics committee approval was therefore not required.

4. Findings

This section presents the findings under the four themes identified through the analysis. Under each theme, the relevant texts associated with Fārābī, Māturīdī, and Aḥmad Yasawī are first examined separately and are then compared in terms of their shared concerns and distinct emphases. Because the degree to which educational concepts are explicitly formulated differs across these sources, the analysis distinguishes statements found directly in the texts from interpretive reconstructions developed within the framework of this study. Historical studies are also used where the institutional settings of the three traditions cannot be established from the primary texts alone. The broader implications of these findings are reserved for the discussion section.

Conception of the human being and the purpose of education

Fārābī

Fārābī maintains that human beings cannot meet all their needs or attain their highest perfection in isolation; they require association and cooperation with others (Fārābī, 2001, 79–80). In al-Madīnat al-Fāḍila, this dependence on cooperation provides the basis for his account of political community. In Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda, theoretical, deliberative, and moral virtues together with practical arts are presented as the four human attainments through which nations and city dwellers attain happiness in this life and the highest happiness in the next (Fārābī, 2018, 1). Taken together, these works support an interpretation of Fārābī's educational perspective as the cultivation of intellectual, moral, and practical capacities within a social and political order.

For Fārābī, the final end of human life is happiness, which he identifies with the human being's attainment of final perfection (Fārābī, 2001, 69–70). The virtuous city

is the political community whose inhabitants cooperate in order to attain happiness (Fārābī, 2001, 79–80). Individual formation and civic order are therefore closely related: human beings attain their perfection through cooperation, while a city becomes virtuous when this cooperation is directed toward happiness. Since Fārābī presents teaching and education as the means through which intellectual, moral, and practical attainments are realised in nations and cities, education may, within the analytical framework of this article, be interpreted as having both an individual and a civic dimension (Fārābī, 2018, 31–33; ee also Aydın, 2010, 124–125, 131–133; Yeşilçayır, 2021, 57–58).

Māturīdī

According to Māturīdī, the human being is created by God and distinguished from other beings by the blessing of reason. While explaining the opening declaration of Qurʾān 7:54, "Indeed, your Lord is Allah," Māturīdī states that God made reason distinctive to human beings, enabling them to recognise the value of divine blessings, give thanks for them, and assess the truthfulness of prophetic communication through evidence (Māturīdī, 2016, 5: 395). Reason thus enables human beings to recognise divine beneficence and examine religious claims through evidence. These remarks do not constitute an explicit theory of education; nevertheless, they provide a basis for interpreting human formation as requiring the proper use of reason in response to revelation. Māturīdī also connects the value of faith with free choice. In his commentary on Qurʾān 50:2, he explains that recompense is deferred so that faith may occur through full free will and thereby acquire value (Māturīdī, 2019, 14: 106–107).

Although Māturīdī does not formulate an explicit definition of education, his exegesis of Qurʾān 2:201—"Our Lord, grant us good in this world and good in the hereafter"—provides a basis for relating human formation to both worldly and otherworldly good. He reports that "good in this world" may refer to knowledge and worship, or to victory and abundant provision, while "good in the hereafter" may refer to paradise and forgiveness, or to divine mercy and God's pleasure. He adds that these interpretations converge in meaning (Māturīdī, 2015, 1: 435–436). Taken together, these passages support an interpretation of human formation centred on reason, revelation, free choice, knowledge, worship, and orientation toward both worldly and otherworldly good. This educational perspective is reconstructed from Māturīdī's theological and exegetical discussions rather than presented by him as an explicit theory of education.

Aḥmad Yasawī

In the Dīwān-i Ḥikmat tradition attributed to Aḥmad Yasawī, the human being is represented through the interrelation of body (jism), soul (jān), and self (nafs), with servitude to God giving direction to human life. One hikmat addresses God with the words, "You created body and soul; let me serve day and night" (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 113). The human being is therefore portrayed not merely as a physical or intellectual being but as one whose bodily and spiritual existence should be oriented toward God. At the same time, the nafs appears as an inner power that can obstruct this orientation and must be disciplined. A hikmat counsels the seeker to "break the self" and thereby become pure in the hereafter (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 58), while another reproaches the person who has not passed beyond the self and turned toward God (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 73). These passages present the human being as capable of spiritual transformation through the disciplining of the self and the orientation of bodily and spiritual existence toward servitude to God.

The collection does not offer an explicit definition of education. Within the analytical framework of this article, its conception of human formation may nevertheless be reconstructed as a process through which the individual disciplines the nafs, turns toward God, and orders bodily and spiritual life around servitude. The purpose of this formation may be interpreted as purification and orientation toward God and the hereafter. Education, in this interpretive sense, concerns the transformation of the person's inner orientation and conduct rather than the transmission of information alone.

When their conceptions of the human being and the purpose of education are compared, the three accounts share the view that human formation is directed toward an end beyond the acquisition of information. In Fārābī, this end is final perfection and happiness, attained through the development of intellectual, moral, and practical capacities within cooperative political life. In Māturīdī, human formation is articulated through reason, revelation, free choice, worship, and orientation toward good in this world and the hereafter. In the Dīwān-i Ḥikmat tradition, it centers on disciplining the nafs, directing bodily and spiritual existence toward servitude to God, and purification in view of the hereafter. The principal difference lies in the frameworks within which human formation is expressed: philosophical and political in Fārābī, theological and exegetical in Māturīdī, and Sufi and poetic in the Yasawī tradition.

Knowledge, Wisdom, and the Learning Process

Fārābī

In Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda, Fārābī places theoretical knowledge among the four human attainments through which nations and city dwellers attain happiness in this life and the highest happiness in the next. Theoretical virtues are sciences whose final aim is to enable the intellect to apprehend beings and what they contain. Some forms of knowledge are possessed from the outset without the individual knowing how they arose and constitute initial cognitions, whereas others are acquired through reflection, investigation, inference, learning, and teaching (Fārābī, 2018, 1–2). Knowledge is therefore not presented as an isolated accumulation of information but as one component of a wider account of human perfection.

These four attainments form a common framework oriented toward happiness (Fārābī, 2018, 1). Deliberative virtue concerns the ability to determine the most beneficial means to a virtuous end (Fārābī, 2018, 20–22). He further argues that theoretical virtue and the governing forms of deliberative virtue, moral virtue, and practical art cannot be separated from one another; without this relationship, the latter three remain defective and insufficient (Fārābī, 2018, 28–29). Knowledge and conduct are therefore related through the interaction of theoretical understanding, sound deliberation, moral formation, and practical activity rather than through a fixed sequence of knowledge, wisdom, and virtue.

Learning and teaching are among the means through which theoretical knowledge is acquired and transmitted. Fārābī also distinguishes instruction, through which theoretical virtues are brought into existence in nations and cities, from education or formation, through which moral virtues and practical arts are established by habituating nations and city dwellers to the corresponding actions and creating in them the resolve to perform those actions (Fārābī, 2018, 31–33). In this framework, the learning process involves both intellectual acquisition and the formation of dispositions and practical capacities directed toward happiness.

Māturīdī

According to Māturīdī, knowledge is essential for the human being to distinguish truth from error and to direct conduct accordingly. In Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, he identifies three routes leading to knowledge of the realities of things and events: perception (idrāk), reports (akhbār), and inference (istidlāl) (Māturīdī, 2014, 46). Perception provides foundational knowledge of the sensible world; reports communicate knowledge that cannot be obtained through direct perception; and inference is required to assess evidence, distinguish truth from falsehood, and investigate matters attainable only through reflection and reasoning (Māturīdī, 2014, 46–51). Māturīdī also presents transmitted guidance and reason as the two means on which knowledge of religion rests (Māturīdī, 2014, 40–42). Together, these three routes provide a structured account of how human beings attain and evaluate reliable knowledge.

Māturīdī's discussion of wisdom connects knowledge with action. In his exegesis of Qurʾān 16:125, he reports that wisdom may refer to the Qurʾān, proof and strong evidence, or demonstrative argument derived from revelation. He then states that wisdom encompasses knowledge and action together (Māturīdī, 2018, 8: 241–242). This account presents wisdom not merely as intellectual possession but as knowledge joined to action. Wisdom thus concerns both what is to be believed and how one is to act. Within the analytical framework of this article, wisdom therefore represents the point at which reliable knowledge informs conduct rather than remaining abstract mental content.

In the educational perspective reconstructed here, learning, reflection, and inference connect the acquisition of knowledge with its practical implications. In his commentary on Qurʾān 16:68, Māturīdī observes that human beings know what is beneficial and harmful only through learning, whereas animals recognise such things without being taught (Māturīdī, 2018, 8: 164). Kitāb al-Tawḥīd further emphasises reflection and inference as necessary for examining evidence, resolving doubt, and distinguishing truth from falsehood (Māturīdī, 2014, 49–51). Reason and transmitted guidance are therefore not presented as rival sources: transmitted knowledge supplies guidance, while rational inquiry examines evidence and establishes its implications (Māturīdī, 2014, 40–42, 46–51). Within the analytical framework of this study, these elements may be understood as complementary dimensions rather than as a fixed pedagogical sequence: perception and reports provide forms of knowledge, rational inquiry examines evidence, and wisdom relates knowledge to action. Learning is therefore indispensable to the acquisition, examination, and practical orientation of knowledge.

Aḥmad Yasawī

In the Dīwān-i Ḥikmat tradition attributed to Aḥmad Yasawī, knowledge is evaluated not by its mere possession but by the intention with which it is sought and by its embodiment in action. One hikmat describes scholars who act on their knowledge as "the lamp of our religion," while warning that those who fail to act bear their learning like the burden of forty donkeys (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 169–170). Another hikmat depicts scholars claiming that they learned from other scholars and acted according to what they knew, but then subjects this claim to divine judgment: knowledge pursued for prestige, public honour, and worldly gain is rejected because it was not sought for God's approval (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 308–309). Knowledge is therefore connected with action, sincerity, and the orientation of learning toward God.

The collection does not formulate a systematic epistemological definition of

wisdom. In this collection, the term hikmat functions primarily as the designation of the poetic discourse through which religious and spiritual meanings are communicated. One hikmat defends expressing the meanings of Qurʾānic verses and hadiths in Turkish, stating that such meanings are appropriate in Turkish and that hearing them from the wise opens the realm of the heart (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 169–170). The preceding hikmat likewise presents its utterance as something intended to be heard by the whole world (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 169). Within the analytical framework of this article, wisdom may therefore be interpreted as religious and spiritual insight communicated in an intelligible language and joined to action, rather than as a purely theoretical possession of the mind.

Learning in the Dīwān-i Ḥikmat tradition also involves continuity, practice, and guidance. A hikmat states that knowledge is necessary for men and women, sons and daughters, and counsels its audience to continue studying as long as they live (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 331). The same section connects reading the Qurʾān with acting upon it and criticizes claims to spiritual authority made without knowledge (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 330–331). Guidance also occupies a prominent place in this process. One hikmat warns that those who claim to enter the path without a pīr remain bewildered halfway and states that the path requires a disciplined guide and a committed disciple (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 228). Another describes the sohbet of the wise as a setting in which "pearls of maʿrifa" are shared and in which the disciple remains firmly attached to the guide (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 327). Within this framework, learning may be reconstructed as a process in which knowledge is acquired continuously, tested by intention, embodied in action, and deepened through disciplined guidance.

When their conceptions of knowledge, wisdom, and the learning process are compared, all three place knowledge within a broader process of human formation rather than treating it as a self-sufficient intellectual possession. In Fārābī, theoretical knowledge is related to deliberative and moral virtues, practical arts, and happiness; learning includes reflection, investigation, inference, teaching, and the formation of dispositions. Māturīdī identifies perception, reports, and inference as routes to knowledge and relates reason to transmitted guidance; he explicitly describes wisdom as encompassing knowledge and action. In the Dīwān-i Ḥikmat tradition, the value of knowledge depends on intention and action, while hikmat serves as a poetic mode of communicating religious and spiritual meanings and learning is sustained through continued study, practice, and guidance. The place of wisdom therefore differs across the three accounts: it is not developed as a separate category in the Fārābī section, it is explicitly joined to knowledge and action in Māturīdī, and it appears in the Yasawī tradition primarily as a form of poetic religious and spiritual discourse. Their principal differences lie in the frameworks and learning processes through which knowledge acquires practical significance: philosophical and civic in Fārābī, theological and epistemological in Māturīdī, and Sufi and poetic in the Yasawī tradition.

Virtue, Morality and Social Order

Fārābī

Fārābī does not reduce virtue to a single intellectual or moral quality. In Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda, the attainment of happiness depends on four interrelated elements: theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues, and practical arts (Fārābī, 2018, 1). Within this framework, human excellence involves theoretical understanding, the ability to discover the most beneficial means to virtuous ends, moral dispositions, and competence in practical activities (Fārābī, 2018, 20–29).

Moral formation is connected with habituation to action. Whereas instruction brings theoretical virtues into existence in nations and cities, education or formation establishes moral virtues and practical arts by habituating nations and city dwellers to the actions arising from these dispositions and by creating in them the resolve to perform such actions (Fārābī, 2018, 31–33). Fārābī adds that these dispositions and their corresponding actions should gain mastery over the souls of those being educated and be deeply and willingly embraced by them. Moral formation therefore concerns the establishment of dispositions that govern conduct and are expressed in action.

In al-Madīnat al-Fāḍila, individual virtue is integrated into a political account of happiness. The virtuous city is the community whose inhabitants cooperate in order to attain happiness (Fārābī, 2001, 79–80). The virtuous ruler knows the actions that lead to happiness and possesses the capacity to teach happiness and the means of attaining it (Fārābī, 2001, 87–89). By contrast, the ignorant cities pursue ends such as necessity, wealth, pleasure, honour, domination, or freedom in place of true happiness. The wicked city knows the beliefs of the virtuous city but acts in the manner of the ignorant cities (Fārābī, 2001, 90–93). Individual virtue and social order are therefore interdependent within Fārābī's political philosophy.

Māturīdī

Māturīdī's commentary on Qurʾān 2:177 provides a basis for understanding virtue through the concept of birr (righteousness). He explains that righteousness is not confined to an outward orientation or an isolated act of worship; it is a submission rooted in the heart, confirmed by the limbs, and encompassing the beliefs and practices enumerated in the verse (Māturīdī, 2015, 1: 346–349). He also notes that the moral value of an outward act depends on the purpose for which it is performed. Within the analytical framework of this article, these explanations provide a basis for relating virtue to the unity of faith, intention, worship, and moral conduct. Virtue is therefore presented not as an abstract quality but through its expression in belief, worship, and conduct.

Māturīdī's commentary on Qurʾān 16:90 provides the principal basis for reconstructing his moral framework. He explains justice as placing everything in its proper place. He relates justice and iḥsān both to the human relationship with God and to relations among people, while treating generosity to relatives and the avoidance of indecency, wrongdoing, and oppression as elements of morally ordered conduct (Māturīdī, 2018, 8: 199–200). He also records interpretations that associate justice with divine unity, iḥsān with fulfilling religious obligations or treating others well, and oppression with injustice toward other people. Within this article, these interpretations provide a basis for understanding morality as conduct ordered by divine commands and expressed in relations with God, relatives, and society.

In his understanding of social order, Māturīdī places the principle of justice at the centre. His explanation that justice consists in placing everything in its proper place provides a conceptual basis for relating moral order to the fulfilment of responsibilities and the just ordering of human relations (Māturīdī, 2018, 8: 199–200). In his commentary on Qurʾān 4:58, he extends the command to return trusts to their rightful recipients to obligations between human beings and God as well as to responsibilities among people. He also associates the command to judge justly particularly with those exercising public authority (Māturīdī, 2016, 3: 253–255). Commenting on Qurʾān 4:59, he argues that public office should be entrusted only to persons possessing

knowledge and insight, since obedience cannot properly be required toward those who lack these qualifications (Māturīdī, 2016, 3: 256–258). These explanations link social order to justice, trust, competence, and responsible authority.

Taken together, these passages relate individual moral formation to faith, worship, morally ordered conduct, justice, trust, and competence, and extend these principles to public life through the proper discharge of trusts, the appointment of qualified persons, and just judgment. This is an interpretive reconstruction from Māturīdī's exegetical discussions rather than an explicit and systematic theory of virtue or society.

Aḥmad Yasawī

The Dīwān-i Ḥikmat tradition attributed to Aḥmad Yasawī does not offer a formal definition of virtue (faḍīla). It portrays moral excellence through the disciplining of the self, sincerity, truthful conduct, and the purification of the heart. One hikmat calls upon the seeker to remain truthful, avoid deception, purify the heart through remembrance of God, and overcome the nafs. It also declares that God does not love those who break hearts (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 425–426). Within the analytical framework of this article, virtue may therefore be understood as an inward transformation that becomes visible in truthful and non-harmful conduct.

The collection likewise presents morality through concrete relations rather than through an abstract definition of khuluq. Its opening hikmat advises the seeker to comfort the poor, the orphaned, and those whose hearts are broken: "Wherever you see a broken heart, be its remedy; if an oppressed person remains on the road, be a companion." It further calls for attending to the condition of the poor, the orphaned, and the vulnerable (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 44–45). The following lines urge the reader to seek out orphans and comfort the hearts of strangers. They also state that causing harm should be avoided even toward an unbeliever and that God is displeased with the hard-hearted person who wounds others (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 45). Moral conduct is thus expressed through compassion, companionship, restraint from harm, and care for vulnerable persons.

The Dīwān-i Ḥikmat does not formulate a systematic theory of social order. Nevertheless, its moral teaching extends individual formation into the sphere of social relations. The disciplining of the nafs is linked to truthful and non-harmful conduct, while care for orphans, the poor, strangers, the oppressed, and the broken-hearted establishes an ethic of responsibility toward others. These exhortations provide a basis for relating social order to compassion, restraint from harm, and support for vulnerable members of society. This is an interpretive reconstruction from the collection's moral exhortations rather than an explicit political or social theory formulated in the text.

When the three accounts are compared, all three connect moral formation with conduct and with relations among people, but they do so through different conceptual structures. Fārābī presents human excellence through the relationship among theoretical, deliberative, and moral virtues and practical arts, and links their realization to happiness and the virtuous city. Māturīdī's exegetical discussions relate birr to faith, intention, worship, and conduct, while relating social order to justice, trust, competence, and responsible authority. In the Dīwān-i Ḥikmat tradition, moral excellence is expressed through the disciplining of the nafs, truthful and non-harmful conduct, compassion, and care for vulnerable persons. The three accounts therefore share an emphasis on the movement from personal formation to conduct and social relations, but they do not employ a common definition of virtue, morality, or social order. Their organizing frameworks are philosophical and political in Fārābī,

theological and exegetical in Māturīdī, and Sufi and poetic in the Yasawī tradition.

Methods and Institutional Structures in Education

Fārābī

In Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda, Fārābī distinguishes between instruction and education or formation. Instruction concerns the communication of theoretical virtues and is carried out through speech. Education or formation concerns moral virtues and practical arts and proceeds by habituating nations and city dwellers to the actions arising from practical dispositions and by creating in them the resolve to perform those actions (Fārābī, 2018, 31–33). Fārābī further distinguishes between formation through persuasion and formation through coercion. Persuasive arguments are used to create a willing resolve to act, whereas coercion is reserved for those who do not act voluntarily or in response to persuasion (Fārābī, 2018, 33–36). The distinction is therefore not simply between theoretical and practical sciences but between different objects and methods of human formation.

Fārābī also distinguishes demonstrative and persuasive modes of communication. He explains that every act of teaching involves two operations: forming a conception of what is taught and securing assent to it. A conception may be produced either through the intellectual apprehension of a thing's essence or through an imagined likeness or example; assent may be produced either through demonstration or through persuasion (Fārābī, 2018, 43–44). He generally associates demonstrative knowledge of intelligibles with the elite, while persuasion and imaginative representation constitute the principal modes used for the wider public. At preparatory stages, however, persuasive and imaginative methods may also be used for those who have not yet acquired the capacity for demonstrative knowledge (Fārābī, 2018, 33–34, 41–44). This differentiation reflects the need to adapt the mode of communication to the intellectual capacities and circumstances of the audience.

The institutional dimension of this account is role-based and political rather than an account of formal schools. In Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda, theoretical sciences are assigned to rulers or imams and to persons entrusted with preserving them. The ruler, in turn, employs persons possessing virtues and practical arts in the formation of nations and city dwellers (Fārābī, 2018, 33–36). In al-Madīnat al-Fāḍila, the first ruler knows the actions leading to happiness and possesses the capacity to teach happiness and the means of attaining it. His qualifications include understanding, memory, eloquence, love of learning and teaching, justice, and determination (Fārābī, 2001, 87–90). The institutional structure that can be reconstructed from these works therefore consists of a political hierarchy of guidance, teaching, preservation of knowledge, and practical formation. The texts do not provide evidence for attributing to Fārābī a specific network or catalogue of madrasas, music schools, literary circles, or other formal educational institutions.

Māturīdī

Māturīdī's exegesis gives repetition an important role in sustaining the effect of admonition and warning. In his interpretation of Qurʾān 39:23—"Allah has sent down the best discourse: a book consistent and reiterative"—he explains that the Qurʾān is described as mathānī because reports, narratives, admonitions, and warnings recur in different passages. Had they not been repeated, people would fall into heedlessness and forget them; repetition allows them to continue benefiting from admonition and warning (Māturīdī, 2018, 12: 345–347). This passage supports repetition as a means of reinforcement in religious communication, but it does not by itself establish a

general theory of gradual instruction or adaptation to the learner's level.

One argumentative procedure in Māturīdī's exegesis is to test a claim through premises acknowledged by the interlocutor. In his commentary on Qurʾān 16:125, he interprets wisdom as the Qurʾān or other proofs and clear evidence. He explains the command to "argue with them in the best manner" as using what the interlocutors themselves acknowledge as evidence against what they deny (Māturīdī, 2018, 8: 240–243). He illustrates this procedure with Qurʾānic debates in which acknowledged premises expose inconsistency. This passage therefore illustrates a mode of argumentation based on evidence and the interlocutor's accepted premises.

Parable and exemplification (tamthīl) also feature in his exegetical method. In interpreting the parable in Qurʾān 16:75, Māturīdī offers two principal explanations: it compares the true object of worship, who possesses the power to bestow blessings, with powerless false objects of worship; or it compares the believer, who uses divine blessings in obedience and good works, with the unbeliever, who does not (Māturīdī, 2018, 8: 176–179). The passage illustrates how a familiar social comparison can clarify theological and moral distinctions.

With respect to institutional structure, historical research associates Māturīdī directly with Dār al-Jūzjāniyya in Samarkand, where he studied and later taught. The institution operated within the Hanafi theological and legal scholarly tradition (Aydınlı, 2019, 588–591; see also Önal, 2013, 329–331). The broader scholarly environment of Samarkand included mosques, madrasas, rulers' palaces, scholars' houses, and ribāṭs in which instruction, scholarly discussion, and debate took place (Aydınlı, 2019, 587–594). These settings describe the wider educational environment of Samarkand rather than places in which Māturīdī is individually documented to have taught. The evidence most securely supports his teaching activity at Dār al-Jūzjāniyya and his participation in the broader scholarly culture of Samarkand.

Aḥmad Yasawī

In the Dīwān-i Ḥikmat tradition attributed to Aḥmad Yasawī, religious and moral formation is communicated through vernacular poetic discourse, direct address, counsel, and repeated refrains. One hikmat defends expressing the meanings of Qurʾānic verses and hadiths in Turkish and associates hearing the words of the wise with the opening of the heart (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 169–170; see also Tosun, 2000, 125–126)). Other hikmats repeatedly call upon the audience to "listen, read, and serve" (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 338–339). These passages support a method combining oral reception, reading, poetic counsel, and practical discipline. They do not, however, establish memorisation or musical performance as pedagogical methods personally employed by Aḥmad Yasawī.

Spiritual guidance through the relationship between the pīr and the disciple occupies a central place in this process. One hikmat warns that those who claim to enter the path without a pīr remain bewildered halfway and states that the path requires a qualified guide, a committed murīd, and service directed toward attaining the pīr's approval (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 228). Other hikmats connect service to the pīr with adab and reiterate the injunction to listen, read, and serve (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 257, 338–339). Within the analytical framework of this article, the method of human formation reflected in the Yasawī tradition may therefore be reconstructed through poetic counsel, attentive listening, reading, spiritual guidance, adab, and disciplined service.

The institutional dimension requires a distinction between the historical activity

associated with Aḥmad Yasawī and practices documented in the later Yasawī tradition. Necdet Tosun's introductory study in the 2017 edition states that, after completing his spiritual education, Aḥmad Yasawī established a dergāh in Yasī, where he provided religious and moral guidance and conveyed his Sufi ideas through simple Turkish poems. The same study notes that these poems were carried by his dervishes to distant Turkish communities (Tosun, 2017, 14–16).

Drawing on later Yasawī sources, Tosun describes later practices of Yasawī spiritual formation through initiation (intisāb), vocal remembrance, retreat (khalwa), spiritual conversation (sohbet), authorisation (khilāfa), and service (Tosun, 2017, 34–38). These accounts indicate that initiation occurred under the direction of a shaykh, that collective retreat included Qurʾānic recitation, remembrance, and the reading of hikmats, and that a disciple who completed the stages of formation could receive authorisation to guide others.

The same study documents vocal forms of collective remembrance, including zikr-i arra, and structured practices of collective retreat in the later Yasawī tradition. These accounts do not demonstrate that Aḥmad Yasawī personally used music as a mnemonic or instructional device, nor do they support the attribution to his dergāh of a formal curriculum, examinations, or a standardised institutional network. The evidence therefore supports two related but distinct findings: a dergāh in Yasī associated with Aḥmad Yasawī's religious and moral guidance through simple Turkish poetry, and a later Yasawī institutional tradition organized through initiation, vocal remembrance, retreat, sohbet, service, and authorisation.

The three accounts reveal different combinations of educational method and institutional organisation rather than a single shared pedagogical model. Fārābī explicitly distinguishes instruction from moral and practical formation, demonstration from persuasion, and voluntary formation from coercion, and places these methods within a role-based political structure. Māturīdī's exegetical practice employs repetition, argument through premises acknowledged by the interlocutor, and parable, while historical evidence associates his teaching activity with Dār al-Jūzjāniyya and the wider scholarly environment of Samarkand. In the Yasawī tradition, vernacular poetic counsel, listening, reading, pīr–murīd guidance, adab, and service constitute the principal modes of formation; institutionally, the evidence distinguishes the dergāh associated with Aḥmad Yasawī in Yasī from the more fully articulated practices of the later Yasawī tradition. The common finding is therefore limited to the use of multiple modes of communication and guidance. The institutional dimensions also differ substantially: Fārābī's account is politically structured and role-based; Māturīdī is connected with a documented scholarly centre and an urban learned milieu; and the Yasawī tradition is dergāh-centred and later organised through Sufi initiation and practice.

Discussion

This discussion interprets the findings in relation to the three research questions. It identifies the broader conceptual patterns that emerge from the findings, clarifies the limits of comparison, and considers their historically situated relevance to contemporary educational debates. The comparison does not assume that Fārābī, Māturīdī, and Aḥmad Yasawī developed equivalent or equally explicit theories of education. Their works differ in genre, intellectual purpose, historical context, and degree of direct engagement with educational concepts.

Distinct Conceptions of Human Formation

The first research question concerned the concepts around which the educationally relevant perspectives of the three figures are organised and the meanings these concepts acquire within their respective intellectual contexts. The findings reveal three distinct ways of articulating human formation.

Fārābī offers the most explicit philosophical account of education among the three. His conception of human formation is organised around perfection, happiness, virtue, practical competence, and political cooperation. Human beings cannot attain their highest perfection in isolation, and the virtuous city is defined by cooperation directed toward happiness (Fārābī, 2001, 69–70, 79–80). Theoretical, deliberative, and moral virtues, together with practical arts, constitute the attainments through which happiness is pursued (Fārābī, 2018, 1, 20–29). His distinction between instruction and education or formation is especially significant: instruction brings theoretical virtues into existence through speech, whereas moral virtues and practical arts are established through habituation and the cultivation of resolve (Fārābī, 2018, 31–33). Demonstration, persuasion, imaginative representation, and, under limited conditions, coercion belong to a differentiated account of communication and formation rather than to a description of a formal school system (Fārābī, 2018, 33–36, 41–44; cf. Aydın, 2010, 140–144). Fārābī's educational thought is therefore inseparable from his philosophical and political account of human happiness.

Māturīdī does not formulate an independent educational theory of this kind. The educational implications identified in his works are reconstructed from theological and exegetical discussions concerning reason, revelation, free choice, knowledge, wisdom, moral conduct, and social responsibility. Perception, reports, and inference are presented as routes to knowledge, while reason and transmitted guidance both contribute to religious understanding (Māturīdī, 2014, 40–51). Wisdom encompasses knowledge and action, thereby connecting reliable understanding with conduct (Māturīdī, 2018, 8: 241–242). His interpretations of *birr*, justice, trust, and public responsibility further show that belief, worship, intention, interpersonal conduct, and responsible authority are treated as related dimensions of moral life. Ateş similarly interprets Māturīdī's account of human nature in terms of changeability, educability, free choice, and the formation of acquired moral dispositions (see Ateş, 2021, 12–15, 28–30).

The methods visible in Māturīdī's exegesis—repetition, argument through premises acknowledged by the interlocutor, and the use of parable—are best understood as features of his interpretive and argumentative practice. They do not establish a general theory of gradual instruction, learner-centred pedagogy, or differentiated teaching for specialist and public audiences. Similarly, the institutional evidence supports his association with Dār al-Jūzjāniyya and the wider scholarly environment of Samarkand, but not the attribution to him of a broad network of personally conducted public lessons (Aydınlı, 2019, 587–594).

In the *Dīwān-i Ḥikmat* tradition associated with Aḥmad Yasawī, human formation is expressed through poetic and Sufi discourse. Its central concepts include the disciplining of the *nafs*, servitude to God, purification, intention, action, spiritual guidance, and moral conduct. Knowledge is not valued simply as possession; its worth depends on the intention with which it is sought and on whether it is embodied in action (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 169–170, 308–309). Learning is connected with continued study, reading, acting upon religious knowledge, and guidance through the relationship between the *pīr* and the disciple (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 228, 327, 330–331).

The collection's moral exhortations extend inward transformation into relations with others through truthfulness, restraint from harm, care for broken hearts, and concern for vulnerable persons (Aḥmad Yasawī, 2017, 44–45, 425–426). Its modes of formation include vernacular poetic counsel, listening, reading, *adab*, guidance, and service. The available evidence does not demonstrate that Aḥmad Yasawī personally employed music or memorisation as pedagogical methods. It is also necessary to distinguish the *dergāh* in Yasī associated with his historical activity from the more fully articulated practices of initiation, vocal remembrance, retreat, *sohbet*, service, and authorisation documented in later Yasawī sources (Tosun, 2017, 14–16, 34–38).

The first research question therefore yields not a single Turkestan educational model but three distinct conceptual configurations of human formation: philosophical and political in Fārābī, theological and exegetical in Māturīdī, and Sufi and poetic in the Yasawī tradition.

Shared Concerns and Irreducible Differences

The second research question concerned the shared concerns and significant differences among the three approaches. The comparison reveals several points of convergence, but these should not be converted into a uniform system or a common technical vocabulary.

The first shared concern is that human formation cannot be reduced to the acquisition or transmission of information. In Fārābī, knowledge belongs to a wider structure directed toward perfection and happiness. In Māturīdī, knowledge is connected with evidence, free choice, religious guidance, action, and moral responsibility. In the Yasawī tradition, knowledge is evaluated through intention, practice, and orientation toward God. Each approach therefore situates knowledge within a wider understanding of what a human being ought to become.

A second shared concern is the relationship between understanding and conduct. Fārābī brings theoretical understanding into relation with deliberative and moral virtues and practical arts. Māturīdī explicitly describes wisdom as encompassing knowledge and action. The Yasawī tradition distinguishes knowledge embodied in sincere conduct from knowledge pursued for prestige or worldly advantage. These parallels, however, do not constitute a common sequence of knowledge, wisdom, and virtue. Wisdom does not occupy the same conceptual position in all three accounts. It is not developed as an independent educational category in the relevant Fārābī passages; it joins knowledge and action in Māturīdī; and *hikmat* functions primarily as a form of poetic religious and spiritual discourse in the Yasawī collection.

A third shared concern is the extension of personal formation into relations with others. Fārābī integrates individual perfection into the cooperative political order of the virtuous city. Māturīdī relates moral and public order to justice, trust, competence, and responsible authority. The Yasawī tradition connects spiritual and moral formation with compassion, non-harm, companionship, and care for vulnerable persons. All three therefore move from the formation of the individual toward conduct within a wider social sphere, but they do not formulate an identical theory of society or pursue a single explicitly stated goal such as "social peace."

Their differences are equally important. Fārābī develops a systematic philosophical and political account of instruction, moral formation, demonstration, persuasion, and civic guidance. Māturīdī's educationally relevant perspective must be reconstructed from theological and exegetical arguments concerning knowledge, evidence, revelation, obligation, justice, and authority. The Yasawī material communicates formation through

poetry, exhortation, spiritual guidance, disciplined practice, and relations between the *pīr* and the disciple.

The institutional differences are also substantial. Fārābī describes a political and role-based hierarchy involving rulers, preservers of knowledge, and persons responsible for the formation of nations and cities. Māturīdī is historically associated with Dār al-Jūzjāniyya and the urban scholarly culture of Samarkand. The Yasawī tradition is linked to a *dergāh* in Yasī and, in its later development, to initiation, remembrance, retreat, *sohbet*, service, and authorisation. These are not different local versions of a single educational institution. They reflect distinct philosophical, scholarly, and Sufi forms of authority and formation.

The comparative contribution of the study therefore lies not in demonstrating complete agreement among the three figures, but in showing how related questions—human purpose, knowledge, conduct, virtue, guidance, and social relations—were addressed through different intellectual languages.

Relevance to Contemporary Educational Debates

The third research question asked how these historically situated perspectives might be brought into dialogue with contemporary educational debates. Their relevance is conceptual and reflective rather than directly prescriptive. They cannot be transferred to contemporary educational institutions without historical, conceptual, and pedagogical mediation.

Biesta's critique of the growing dominance of measurement calls for renewed attention to the purposes and direction of education and to the relationship among qualification, socialisation, and subjectification (Biesta, 2009, 33–35, 39–41). The classical sources examined here do not provide contemporary solutions to the problems of assessment or accountability. They do, however, demonstrate that questions of education and human formation have historically been related to wider conceptions of the human good. Fārābī organizes formation around happiness and perfection; Māturīdī relates human responsibility to reason, revelation, free choice, and worldly and otherworldly good; and the Yasawī tradition directs formation toward purification, servitude, and moral transformation. These perspectives broaden the historical vocabulary through which the purpose of education may be discussed.

The findings also contribute to debates about the relationship between knowledge, values, and conduct. Halstead analyses Islamic education through individual development, understanding society and its moral rules, and the transmission of knowledge (Halstead, 2004, 522–523). The present study shows that these dimensions take different forms within the selected sources. Fārābī relates theoretical knowledge to deliberation, moral disposition, and practical capacity. Māturīdī connects knowledge with evidence, transmitted guidance, action, justice, and trust. The Yasawī tradition evaluates knowledge through intention, moral practice, and spiritual guidance. Their contribution to current discussions of values education therefore lies not in providing a common curriculum, but in demonstrating several historical ways of connecting knowledge with human conduct.

The relationship between individual formation and social or political life provides another point of comparison. Peterson argues that character formation and expression require attention to the relationship between the moral and the political because individuals remain closely connected with their social associations (Peterson, 2020, 143). Fārābī offers the most explicit political account by relating individual perfection to cooperation within the virtuous city. Māturīdī connects moral principles with

public life through justice, trust, competence, and responsible authority. The Yasawī tradition approaches relations with others through compassion, restraint from harm, and responsibility toward vulnerable persons. These are distinct historical perspectives on the social dimensions of formation; they should not be collapsed into a single communitarian or service-based model.

The three bodies of thought also display different modes of communication and guidance. The International Commission on the Futures of Education emphasises cooperation, collaboration, solidarity, and the development of intellectual, social, and moral capacities (International Commission on the Futures of Education, 2021, 2, 4). Fārābī distinguishes instruction, habituation, demonstration, persuasion, and imaginative representation. Māturīdī's exegesis employs repetition, argument from acknowledged premises, and parable. The Yasawī tradition employs vernacular poetry, counsel, listening, reading, spiritual guidance, *adab*, and service. These practices are not direct equivalents of contemporary pedagogical methods, but they demonstrate that historical approaches to formation employed more than one mode of communication, reasoning, practice, and guidance.

In Türkiye, the *Türkiye Yüzyılı Maarif Modeli Öğretim Programları Ortak Metni* identifies the cultivation of the competent and virtuous person as an ultimate aim and seeks to integrate knowledge, skills, dispositions, and values within a holistic framework (MEB, 2025, 5, 35–36). The findings of this study provide historical and conceptual points of comparison for such aims. They do not establish that classical philosophical, theological, or Sufi concepts can be inserted directly into curricula, teacher education, or educational policy. Any attempt at contemporary application would require separate curricular, pedagogical, and empirical research.

The discussion therefore supports a limited but meaningful conclusion: the three traditions enrich contemporary debates not by offering ready-made educational models, but by preserving fundamental questions about human purpose, the moral significance of knowledge, the relation between personal formation and social life, and the plurality of methods through which formation may occur.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study comparatively examined the educationally relevant concepts and practices associated with Fārābī, Māturīdī, and Aḥmad Yasawī under four themes: the conception of the human being and the purpose of education; knowledge, wisdom, and the learning process; virtue, morality, and social order; and methods and institutional structures in education.

The first main conclusion is that the three bodies of thought do not constitute equivalent or equally explicit theories of education. Fārābī develops a systematic philosophical and political account of happiness, virtue, instruction, moral formation, and civic cooperation. Māturīdī does not formulate an independent educational theory; the educational implications identified in his works are reconstructed from theological and exegetical discussions of reason, revelation, free choice, knowledge, wisdom, justice, and trust. The *Dīwān-i Ḥikmat* tradition similarly presents human formation through poetic and Sufi language concerning the *nafs*, servitude, intention, action, guidance, and moral conduct.

The second conclusion is that several shared concerns can be identified without reducing the three approaches to a single model. All three situate human formation within a broader conception of the good, connect understanding with conduct, and

extend personal formation into relations with others. Their concepts, aims, methods, and institutional settings nevertheless remain distinct. Fārābī's framework is philosophical and political; Māturīdī's is theological and exegetical; and the Yasawī tradition is Sufi and poetic.

The third conclusion is that the contemporary relevance of these approaches is historical and conceptual rather than directly prescriptive. They may enrich discussions concerning educational purpose, the relationship between knowledge and action, moral and social formation, and methodological diversity. They do not provide ready-made models for contemporary curricula, institutions, assessment systems, teacher education, or educational policy.

The study is limited to the selected Turkish editions and translations and to passages relevant to the four analytical themes. It does not attempt to reconstruct the complete philosophical, theological, or Sufi systems of the three figures. Nor does it claim that the wider Turkestan Turkish-Islamic intellectual tradition constituted a single, standardised educational system. In the case of Aḥmad Yasawī, the study also distinguishes the historical activity associated with him from the practices documented in the later Yasawī tradition.

Future research may compare the Turkish editions and translations used here with the relevant original-language texts and manuscript traditions, particularly the Arabic sources of Fārābī and Māturīdī and the Chaghatay or other Turkic witnesses of the *Dīwān-i Ḥikmat*. It may also examine the later reception of these bodies of thought in educational, theological, political, and Sufi institutions. Institutional claims should be investigated through independent historical and archival evidence rather than inferred solely from philosophical, exegetical, or poetic texts. Focused comparative studies may further explore individual themes such as educational purpose, moral formation, knowledge and action, authority, guidance, justice, and social responsibility.

Any proposal to draw on these traditions in contemporary curricula, values education, teacher education, or educational policy should be preceded by separate curricular and empirical research. Such research would need to consider not only the conceptual relevance of classical ideas but also their historical distance, contemporary educational conditions, the needs of learners, and the plural character of modern societies.

References

Aristoteles. *Nikomakhos'a Etik*. çev. Saffet Babür. Ankara: BilgeSu Yayıncılık, 10. Basım, 2020.

Ateş, Nimet. "İmam Mâtürîdî'nin Ahlâk Düşüncesinde Ahlakın Kaynağı Olarak İnsan Tabiatı". *Din ve Felsefe Araştırmaları* 4/7 (Haziran 2021), 5–32.

Aydın, Hasan. "Dinî-Felsefî Temelleri Işığında Fârâbî'nin Eğitim Ütopyası". *Kelam Araştırmaları* 8/1 (2010), 123–150.

Aydınlı, Osman. "İmâm Mâtürîdî'nin Yetiştiği İlmî Ortam ve Semerkant'ta İlim Merkezleri". *Diyanet İlmî Dergi* 55/3 (2019), 565–599.

Berkey, Jonathan Porter. *The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History of Islamic Education*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400862580

Biesta, Gert J. J. "Good Education in an Age of Measurement: On the Need to Reconnect with the Question of Purpose in Education". *Educational Assessment, Evaluation and Accountability* 21/1 (Şubat 2009), 33–46. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11092-008-9064-9

Bowen, Glenn A. "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method". *Qualitative Research*

Journal 9/2 (2009), 27–40. https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027.

Fârâbî, Ebû Nasr. *el-Medînetü'l-Fâzıla*. çev. Nafiz Danışman. 4. baskı. Ankara: Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001.

Fârâbî, Ebû Nasr. *Mutluluğun Kazanılması*. Arapça aslından çev. Ahmet Arslan. 3. basım. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2018.

Halstead, J. Mark. "An Islamic Concept of Education". *Comparative Education* 40/4 (Kasım 2004), 517–529. https://doi.org/10.1080/0305006042000284510

International Commission on the Futures of Education. *Reimagining Our Futures Together: A New Social Contract for Education*. Paris: UNESCO, 2021. https://doi.org/10.54675/ASRB4722

Konfüçyüs. *Konuşmalar*. Çinceden çev. Giray Fidan. haz. Yang Bojun. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1. Basım, 2021.

Mâtürîdî, Ebû Mansûr Muhammed b. Muhammed. *Te'vîlâtü'l-Kur'ân Tercümesi*. ed. Yusuf Şevki Yavuz. çev. Bekir Topaloğlu vd. 17 cilt. İstanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2015–2019.

Mâtürîdî, Ebû Mansûr. *Kitâbü't-Tevhîd: Açıklamalı Tercüme*. çev. Bekir Topaloğlu. 6. basım. İstanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2014.

Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı. *Türkiye Yüzyılı Maarif Modeli Öğretim Programları Ortak Metni*. Ankara: Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı, 2025.

Nowell, Lorelli S. - Norris, Jill M. - White, Deborah E. - Moules, Nancy J. "Thematic Analysis: Striving to Meet the Trustworthiness Criteria". *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 16 (2017), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1177/1609406917733847

OECD. *Education at a Glance 2023: OECD Indicators*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1787/e13bef63-en.

Önal, Recep. "Mâtürîdî'nin Hayatı, Eserleri ve Kelam İlmi'ndeki Yeri". *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi* 8/3 (2013), 325–360.

Peterson, Andrew. "Character Education, the Individual and the Political". *Journal of Moral Education* 49/2 (2020), 143–157. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2019.1653270

Platon. *Devlet*. çev. Sabahattin Eyüboğlu - M. Ali Cimcoz. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 35. Basım, 2018.

Rosenthal, Franz. *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam*. Giriş Dimitri Gutas. Gözden Geçirilmiş 2. Basım. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004153868.i-355.

TEDMEM. *2022 Eğitim Değerlendirme Raporu*. TEDMEM Değerlendirme Dizisi 9. Ankara: Türk Eğitim Derneği, 2023. https://tedmem.org/storage/publications/July2023/LAImPTRTIAZgnWYFXcPh.pdf

Toprak, Salih. "Farabi'nin Eğitim Anlayışı". *Genç Mütefekkirler Dergisi* 1/2 (Aralık 2020), 136–149.

Tosun, Cemal. "Hoca Ahmed Yesevî, Hayatı, Eserleri ve Toplumu Eğitme Metodu". *Dinî Araştırmalar* 2/6 (Ocak-Nisan 2000), 119–132.

Tosun, Necdet. "Hoca Ahmed Yesevî". *Dîvân-ı Hikmet*. ed. Mustafa Tatcı. 11–39. Ankara: Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Uluslararası Türk-Kazak Üniversitesi, 2017.

Tunçpınar, Ahmet Sait. "İmâm Mâtürîdî'nin Eğitimle Alâkalı Bazı Ayetlere Getirdiği Yorumlar". *Uluğ Bir Çınar İmâm Mâtürîdî Uluslararası Sempozyum Tebliğler Kitabı*. haz. Ahmet Kartal. 229–250. İstanbul: Doğu Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2014.

Yasawī, Aḥmad. *Dīwān-i Ḥikmat*. ed. Mustafa Tatcı. Turkish rendering by Hayati Bice. Ankara: Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Uluslararası Türk-Kazak Üniversitesi, 2017.

Yeşilçayır, Celal. "Farabi'nin Eğitim Felsefesi Bağlamında Din ve Felsefeyi Konumlandırışı". *Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi* 1 (Nisan 2021), 52–64.

Extended Abstract

Contemporary education systems make extensive use of examinations, measurable outcomes, and performance indicators. Although these instruments serve important functions in evaluating learning, their prominence may intensify the tension between achievement-oriented expectations and broader educational aims involving moral, social, and spiritual formation. This tension makes it relevant to revisit historical approaches that relate education not only to the transmission of knowledge but also to conceptions of human purpose, virtue, conduct, and social responsibility. Against this background, the present study examines the educationally relevant perspectives found in the works of Fārābī and Māturīdī and in the *Dīwān-i Ḥikmat* tradition associated with Aḥmad Yasawī. These three bodies of thought are considered distinct philosophical, theological, and Sufi articulations associated with the wider Turkestan Turkish-Islamic intellectual tradition. The study aims to identify their principal concepts, shared concerns, and significant differences within their respective historical and intellectual contexts and to assess their historically situated relevance to contemporary educational debates.

The study employs qualitative document analysis. Its primary corpus consists of Fārābī's *al-Madīnat al-Fāḍila* and *Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda*; Māturīdī's *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* and *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*; and the *Dīwān-i Ḥikmat* tradition associated with Aḥmad Yasawī. Secondary historical studies were consulted where institutional or contextual claims could not be established from the primary texts alone. The documentary data were examined under four main themes: the conception of the human being and the purpose of education; knowledge, wisdom, and the learning process; virtue, morality, and social order; and methods and institutional structures in education. These themes were established deductively from the research questions, while their internal distinctions were refined through repeated engagement with the texts. Since the selected sources differ in genre and in the extent to which they formulate educational concepts explicitly, the analysis distinguishes direct textual statements from interpretive educational reconstructions.

The findings reveal three distinct configurations of human formation rather than a single educational model. Fārābī develops the most explicit and systematic account of education among the three. He relates human perfection and happiness to theoretical, deliberative, and moral virtues, practical arts, and cooperation within the virtuous city. His distinction between instruction and education or formation indicates that theoretical understanding, moral disposition, and practical competence require different processes. He distinguishes instruction from habituation-based moral and practical formation and differentiates demonstration, persuasion, and imaginative representation as modes of communication. The institutional dimension of his account is primarily political and role-based rather than a description of a formal network of schools.

Māturīdī does not formulate an independent educational theory comparable in form to Fārābī's. The educational implications of his thought are reconstructed from theological and exegetical discussions concerning reason, revelation, free choice, knowledge, wisdom, moral obligation, justice, and trust. His account of perception, reports, and inference identifies different routes to knowledge, while his treatment of reason and transmitted guidance emphasises their complementary roles in religious understanding. His interpretation of wisdom as encompassing both knowledge and action connects reliable understanding with conduct. His discussions of justice, trust, competence, and public authority also connect individual moral responsibility with social and public relations. Repetition, argument based on premises acknowledged by the interlocutor, and the use of parable appear as features of his exegetical and argumentative practice; however, they do not by themselves constitute a systematic theory of gradual or learner-centred pedagogy.

In the *Dīwān-i Ḥikmat* tradition associated with Aḥmad Yasawī, human formation is articulated through poetic and Sufi discourse. The disciplining of the *nafs*, servitude to God, purification, intention, action, spiritual guidance, and moral conduct occupy a central position. Knowledge is valued not merely as possession but according to the intention with which it is pursued and the extent to which it is reflected in action. Continued study, engagement with the Qurʾān, guidance through the relationship between the *pīr* and the disciple, poetic

counsel, listening, reading, *adab*, and service constitute important dimensions of formation. The moral outlook of the collection extends inward transformation into relations with others through truthfulness, restraint from harm, care for broken hearts, and concern for vulnerable persons. The available evidence does not support attributing to Aḥmad Yasawī a systematic educational use of music or memorisation. It is also necessary to distinguish the historical activity associated with his *dergāh* in Yasī from the more fully articulated practices documented in the later Yasawī tradition.

The comparison identifies several shared concerns without reducing the three approaches to a common system. In all three bodies of thought, knowledge is situated within a wider framework rather than treated as the mere possession of information. Each relates understanding to conduct and extends personal formation into relations with others. Nevertheless, their concepts, aims, methods, and institutional settings remain substantially different. Fārābī's framework is philosophical and political; Māturīdī's is theological and exegetical; and the Yasawī tradition is Sufi and poetic. Accordingly, the study does not posit a uniform sequence of knowledge, wisdom, and virtue or a standardised Turkestan educational model.

These historically situated perspectives cannot be transferred to contemporary educational institutions without conceptual, historical, and pedagogical mediation. Their relevance lies instead in broadening discussions about educational purpose, the relationship between knowledge and action, moral and social formation, and methodological diversity. Fārābī directs attention to the relationship between individual perfection and political cooperation; Māturīdī highlights evidence, responsible choice, justice, and the connection between knowledge and action; and the Yasawī tradition emphasises self-discipline, spiritual guidance, moral conduct, and responsibility toward others. These perspectives provide historical and conceptual resources for reconsidering the aims of education without offering ready-made prescriptions for curricula, assessment systems, teacher education, or educational policy.

Keywords: Philosophy of Education, Fārābī, Māturīdī, Aḥmad Yasawī, Turkestan Turkish-Islamic Intellectual Tradition.